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

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Why is this man on the cover of this magazine?

See page 22

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

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

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

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"The rest is silence"
(Shakespeare, Henry IV part I)



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Paul Rogers on solutions to the Gulf crisis

Eastern Block



Photo: Frank Spooner Pictures Cartoon: Nick Newman

To Western observers, the Iraqi regime is quasi-fascist and grandiosely ambitious, a danger to its neighbours and to Western economic interests. Saddam Hussein has proved himself to be a ruthless and effective leader, willing to use any military instrument in pursuit of his aims. Yet it is Western policy, and especially that of the United States, which makes it so easy for Saddam to garner support.

By refusing steadfastly to call Israel to account for its treatment of the Palestinians, the West has hugely damaged its credibility in the eyes of many Arabs, allowing Iraq a remarkable measure of support, which it would ordinarily lack. Moreover, that public support is an acute concern to President Mubarak as well as the Gulf kings and emirs because it undermines their own political and military response to the annexation of Kuwait.

Behind the crisis there is a growing polarisation between Arab popular opinion and Western political interests. This found expression in the stand-off between Western military forces and a determined and skilful Saddam Hussein with a war-hardened army and the military technology so happily supplied by East and West in the past. The further complication is Israel, which could well be interested in an escalation of the crisis and is only too anxious to see Iraq, a would-be nuclear power, defeated and disarmed.

Even if the outcome of the crisis is the defeat of Iraq, this will do little to bring greater stability to the region as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict remains so heavily weighted against the Palestinians. Indeed, it may accelerate Arab resentment, exacerbated by the Western military presence in the Gulf, which will sow the seeds of future conflict.

In a difficult and complex situation, the most stable course of action in the coming weeks would be to maintain sanctions, do everything possible to encourage further Arab dialogue and offer to withdraw US ground forces in favour of Arab forces. As sanctions bite and if horrendous war is to be avoided, then the Iraqis have to be offered some small way out, probably involving a non-Iraqi Arab force in Kuwait, in parallel with negotiations. Meanwhile, all efforts must be made to contain any belligerent Israeli activities.

In the longer term, Western states have to accept that their 'protectorates' in the Gulf cannot isolate themselves from the rest of the Middle East. Gulf wealth is coveted throughout the region, and Western concern to ensure economic stability and the security of its oil interests is seen as nothing less than a quasi-colonial relationship.

The shape of the international order in the post-cold war world is at stake in the methods used to resolve this crisis. By the same token, the future of the Middle East depends to a large extent upon the role the United States ultimately assumes in finding a solution. From the outset Washington hovered between a self-appointed policing role and a participating role in a multinational response to the crisis under the auspices of the United Nations. A diplomatic solution with the involvement of Arab states as key figures in any negotiations would be the most positive outcome.

This would also call for an assessment of the deeper historical tensions which provide the context for the current crisis. For if a genuine Israeli-Palestinian dialogue can be fostered, and if oil wealth can be more justly shared throughout the region, the beginnings of a more stable political environment can be created. But if the West, under US leadership, believes it can achieve its objectives only through the use of force, then an indefinite military presence in the Gulf is the likely result. With or without the presence of Saddam Hussein, this would constitute a further cause of tension in an already volatile region. If the latter course is adopted, then the first international post-cold war crisis may mark the start of an era in which the US 'keeps the violent peace' with unpredictable and potentially destabilising results. ●

Paul Rogers

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EYE TO EYE

Beatrix Campbell engages with the defence debate

Fighting Forces

Alan Clark is minister for defence procurement

What does Britain need to defend itself against and who should it be defending itself with? What is our position now in the world, given the revolution in Europe?
When I was co-ordinating resistance within the Conservative Party to the placing of cruise missiles in the United Kingdom, I consistently expressed the view that the Soviet threat had been steadily declining for at least a decade. At that time that was regarded as very heterodox, a view only held by so-called fellow travellers. Yet up until now, to the immense detriment and imbalancing of its own economic structure and the quality of life of its people, the Soviet Union has maintained an enormous inventory of military hardware.

We must pay some regard to that, to the existence anywhere of very large numbers of weapons that are completely outside the control, either of the United Kingdom or of any alliance to which it adheres. But it is generally recognised that the old form of Soviet threat, the Warsaw Pact, the 'snow on their boots' syndrome, is pretty well extinct and this has been confirmed in judgments uttered by the Nato Council no less.

Given the long trajectory of your position, are you less of a Thatcherite and more akin to politicians like Biffen or Powell, belonging to that axis which is not animated by dread of the Soviet Union?
I am absolutely Thatcherite to the extent that I believe that Mrs Thatcher has got in the bank, as it were, enough gratitude to see me through. She has done us so much good that I would never wish to separate from her.

Thinking specifically about Thatcherism and defence...
That's easy. Although I may have been right in spotting the trend, I think that the Thatcherite position is entirely defensible. The moment you got a realist like Gorbachev the thing was going to fold. But undoubtedly the response to the SS20 and the decision to place intermediate nuclear missiles, cruise and Pershing in Europe, was a factor. I was opposed to it for various reasons. But the SDI initiative was actually what put them over the edge.

However, I am vulnerable to the argument that if you had just followed my advice – saying this is crazy, just get out of Europe because it isn't under threat, save your money – we might not have been able to maintain that unbearable level of competitive tension that was critical in getting the Soviet Union to pack up.

The world has tilted on its axis. You're known to be a radical, but is your radicalism sufficient to infuse the government with a radicalism commensurate with the new situation?
I think it is recognised that I was the first person to put it all into one shape and then a great many serious, well-informed people from the services, from the civil service, from every other angle have all contributed to making it in terms of Whitehall and Westminster certainly more realistic than the original blueprint I set.

What would free the public debate about strategic changes in defence, defence spending and our alliances?
Nobody who has been through the hideous experience of an Etonian education could ever again believe naively about the goodness of human nature. You have to defend yourself against the unpredictable. But one of my complaints about our earlier posture was that it was not only hideously expensive but it was also unbalanced. We were actually equipped to do two things: retaliate very effectively at a strategic nuclear level and fight a heavy armoured war on the central front, which I think we would inevitably have lost and which would have been extremely costly and disagreeable. It would be imprudent to discard the first of those capabilities, but the second is completely obsolete.

You have argued for streamlined services, specialised, small and very mobile. Is that equivalent to the transition from cavalry to the modern army?
I don't think it is quite as drastic. But there is a lot of detailed work to be done even if you accept the general principle, and many don't.

Will you win the argument?
Well I'm some way towards winning it, but there have been radicals in this department before and they have been thwarted as much by circumstances as personality. It is very easy to put radical solutions, it's much less easy to temper them to the realities of what will be accepted.

What are your political calculations about Britain both as a power and as a participant in the worldwide debate about what the world has become?
Most of the turbulence and cruelty and massacre is going to take place outside the European continent. The European Community is not equipped to 'show the flag' in such sectors, but it will be necessary to 'show the flag' on occasions, to project force, and to balance a monopolistic intervention by the only superpower on the western side, as well as to defend our own interests. The United Kingdom is by far the best suited to make this kind of demonstrative intervention. If Europe must persist in its land-locked obsessions and spend money on armies to fight a central front, that's down to them.

Then you say, what sort of forces should we have. I think in personnel terms they have got to be trained and equipped to fight in deserts, in jungles, in urban environments, as well as in bourgeois semi-built-up, hedgerow-village-type environments. The Royal Marines and the Paratroop Regiment are the exemplars of the sort of forces we need.

What qualifies Britain for that role? We don't have an imperial or imperialist presence all over the world any longer.
I think it is natural. So many countries speak English and have institutions founded on English patterns and with a very large English presence in their trade. British investments overseas are larger than that of any other country. We are at parity with Japan, but larger than the rest of the European Community put together. With these interests go, broadly, a certain cordiality and prestige.

Doesn't that imply an economic repertoire associated with empire?
It is a matter of common prudence that there should be another power able to dilute the monopoly of one superpower. Otherwise you have nothing between a United Nations intervention force, which is extremely slow, very cumbersome and usually ineffective, and a kind of single-nation, heavy-metal type.

You are for a refinement of Britain's historic role – with greater autonomy – rather than repositioning Britain?
It is also contemporary because we are the largest overseas investor in the world. But I must emphasise that this is a personal attitude that has informed my own approach to defence. I am fully conscious that such an attitude has to be touched, if not governed, by a whole range of diplomatic and geopolitical considerations which are properly within the judgment of the prime minister and the cabinet. It is all very well to say Nato's existing role is extinct, therefore there is no need for it. It is as easy to say that as it is to say we must restructure it.

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EYE TO EYE



Photography: Abel Lagos

Tell us where you want to get to with the peace dividend. What do you feel about the imperatives guiding defence cuts at the moment?

It is no secret that I take a more generous attitude to what is possible than some. But politically it could cause industrial disruption. There is all this talk about arms conversion – complete hogwash, what does it mean?

Reinvestment in...

It must mean a fund. Where does it come from? Central revenue? A levy on the arms trade? And who guarantees anyone is going to buy the things that they convert to? All of a sudden we are told the government can sail in after 15 years of standing back and decide that there is a need for a few things and so we will pay money for industry to make them.

What is wrong with that?

First, who decides what there is a need for, and why should their judgment be set above the corporate judgment of the market? Secondly, if there is such a need for it industry will see that need and will make it themselves.

So, against quite radical cuts to produce an instant dividend, you have to balance industrial disruption, people being put out of work suddenly, heavy lobbying by directors and boards concerned, and also considerable resentment within the services themselves – their own career structures imperilled. That feeds across politically into the Conservative associations.

There are many ex-service people, often of quite senior rank, holding positions in Conservative associations. And you have to measure a general disharmony in alliance structures which follows unilateral action. If the downside is greater than the financial benefits then that has to be a political judgment.

What do you feel about nuclear deterrence, and to be more specific, tactical air-to-surface missiles (TASMs)?

Nuclear deterrence is quintessential, you can't do without it.

How central are TASMs?

Nuclear weapons are going to proliferate, you can't prevent that any more than you can prevent people having sexual intercourse or exceeding the speed limit when they are driving a car. You will be faced with nuclear blackmail by enemies against whom it would be excessive and extravagent to deploy a Trident salvo, as well as being immensely damaging to the world ecology.

You want to be able to deter something

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

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at roughly the equivalent level, and a tactical air-to-surface missile is that very weapon. It may not be essential at this moment, but by the time it is developed and in service it will be. Otherwise you will be faced with the problem of having to back off a military confrontation, quite possibly by popular demand, if you are faced with a nuclear response by an irresponsible power that has recently acquired that capability. The Russians are immensely cautious and responsible. We always knew where we were in terms of nuclear response with the Russians. But you can't tell with some of these other possible acquisitors.

Is there anything that the nuclear nations might do politically that might pre-empt this and guard the world against the consequences of possession of nuclear weapons outside the predictable political systems?
No. Because there is no means of verification. The kind of exemplary disarmament they often argue for from the Labour benches is utterly unreal.

What is your feeling about the impact on security of factors outside the military: the economic and environmental?
I am very concerned by the consistently poor economic performance of the United Kingdom. Our manufacturing industry is very defective.

As a market man how can you solve that problem?
Well, you see one is vulnerable to the inherent flaws – as I fear they are – in one's ideology. As a market man, I have to reply, the market has to solve that problem.

Doesn't that grieve you? Is that the full-stop? Is there no more to be said?
Well it would mean trespassing right outside my role as minister of this department.

Some more personal questions. You jested earlier about the horror of an Etonian schooling.
Well, it was very beneficial at an early age to be...

Brutalised?
Brutalisation can take two forms, both of which I have undergone. One is the Etonian education where there is the intellectual kind: it's not so much a brutalisation as a very cruel and long-drawn-out initiation ceremony to a fraternity. And then there is the much rougher brutalisation which takes place at the Guards Brigade Squad Camp, which every guards officer has to undergo. Quite rightly it is worse than that to which the ranks are subjected.

So when you see all those 'chinless wonders' strutting about in their posh uniforms, you will know that for eight weeks they have had an absolutely appalling time, probably worse than you will get anywhere outside a Victorian prison.

So what kind of people does that produce: these people who run our armies and indeed run your party?
They don't run the party. They used to. And I am not sure – and I tread on very dangerous ground – if the party is better run now.

We have this incredible phenomenon of a prime minister, who is a person with boundless energy, great sureness of instinct, deep patriotism and immense courage, as well as a very engaging personal style at close quarters. Those are ingredients which, in politics, are bound to get you to the top. But she is completely unique, *sui generis*. Her success hasn't made the slightest difference to the status of women in politics, for example.

Yet many of the other figures in the Conservative Party are separate from the old prototypes of whom I suppose I am an example, and I am looked upon by them with considerable suspicion.

Apart from élan, what for you are the elements that are inherent in Thatcherism? Is it an ideology which is internally coherent? Or has it been a very effective gathering, if you like a coalition of different interests within the Conservative Party, very effectively put together but not necessarily historically durable?
I think that is an extremely interesting question. I think the PM's attitude has been consistent and I think she is informed throughout by an absolutely pure patriotism. But the Conservative Party is very shameless in this regard – it will always back anyone if it thinks they are going to win. So that is how you get a coalition in the Conservative Party. Of course the moment it looks as if she is not going to win she is in jeopardy. This is what was at the bottom of all that ridiculous seizure that got hold of people for about five weeks last spring when many claimed that another person was more likely to win. 'Another person' wouldn't have lasted five weeks – he just hasn't got it.

I suppose part of the problem is that if you are on the left you search for a kind of ideological coherence. The Right seems to be more comfortable with the idea that Thatcherism is successful because it has élan and it is a winner, and the Right is less interested in its ideology.
The Left are always trying to pin labels on people in the Tory Party. They get very muddled because you can be on the right economically, and on the left socially – that is to say pro-abortion, against capital punishment.

One of my advantages is that, even in the party, I am regarded as being on the right. So if you argue for things which fall more naturally to the left – not just to the left of the party, to the left in politics generally – they will excuse you by saying, 'Oh well, he's eccentric, he's a bit batty but basically he's alright'. But if my case for defence cuts had been written by one of the Wets (and there are plenty of them) the boys would have cut out his entrails by now. I'm sure it's true of the Labour Party too. I don't know much about the Labour Party, but Neil Kinnock couldn't have done it without good credentials. David Owen could never have done it.

He had to have come from the Left to, as it were, deal with what was perceived as the problem of the Left?
If you are going to change things inside a party, I wouldn't say you could only do it from within the camp of those whose tranquility you are going to disturb, but it is very much easier. That is as true on the left as it is on the right.●



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Richard Evans gets caught in the reunification rush

Berlin Unlimited

Nine months after it was breached, you can still get hold of your souvenir piece of the Berlin Wall – but you'll have to hurry. In its later years, much of the western side of the Wall was covered in elaborate graffiti, but the smooth outer cladding on which the graffiti were painted has long since been chipped off and sold to tourists. All you can see now in most places is the rough concrete infill, held together by rusty reinforcing cables.

Walking along the other side, which is still largely undamaged, I came across a man chipping away with a hammer and chisel. He gestured to a collection of fragments, all of them brightly coloured with spray-paint, and pressed me to buy one. 'But this is the *wrong side* of the Wall,' I protested; and indeed we were in the old 'death strip', extending 100 metres or so behind the Wall on the eastern side, where, before last November 9, anyone armed with a spray-can, or indeed armed with nothing at all, would have been spotted at once and met with instant arrest, or even a hail of bullets. 'Old paint, old paint!' expostulated the man in selfdefence. But I had already noticed, and smelled, the freshly-painted section next to him. 'What's that then?' I asked. 'Oh,' he rep-lied witheringly. 'Of course that's new paint. But in a couple of hours it'll be old paint!'

From object of terror to artefact, to relic and now to invented past, the Wall has gone through some startling metamorphoses in recent times. Its reduction to a commodity symbolises only too clearly the processes at work in the east since currency unification. For this is not the privatisation of a single industry, or even a whole group of industries; it is the privatisation of an entire economy.

So many state-owned enterprises are now clamouring to go private that the agency hastily created to oversee the process appears to be overwhelmed. Meanwhile, western shops are already opening up in the east, and the pathetic attempts of the state-owned consumer goods outlets to keep their customers seem doomed to failure.

East Berlin is less crowded than it used to be: for tourists it no longer holds the exotic allure of the communist police state, and for its own inhabitants it mainly seems to be somewhere to get out of.

By contrast, west Berlin must now be one of Europe's most overcrowded cities. Every supermarket seems full of Poles coming over to buy the goods they still can't get in their own country, and east Berliners flocking over to do their shopping, though it's getting increasingly hard to tell them apart from the westerners as they discard their cheap and drably-coloured synthetic clothing for Levis and cotton t-shirts. Workers can earn vastly more D-marks in the west, while a substantial number have already been made redundant as antiquated and overmanned east German industries collapse in the face of western competition or are taken over by western firms and subjected to ruthless restructuring.

Even last year it was difficult to find anywhere to live in west Berlin; now it's become virtually impossible. Migrants from the east may find food in plentiful supply, but every advertisment for a flat in west Berlin produces a queue whose dimensions rival those once familiar on the other side of the Wall.

So fast is the process of economic and social reunification moving, that much of it inevitably has an improvised character. You can now travel freely around the city and outside it by bus or train, for example, but a ticket from west Berlin to east Berlin will cost you more than 10 times as much as a ticket in the other direction, and will continue to do so until new ticket machines are installed in the east.

It is this hasty and makeshift aspect of the process that is worrying many on the Left. For in the frantic struggle to master the nuts and bolts of unification, few people seem to be giving the overall picture much serious thought. A slower and more considered approach might have provided the opportun ity to think about whether there were things in the east from which the west could learn. The occasion could have been used to take a fresh and critical look at west Germany's social and political institutions. But the opportunity is largely being missed. In the end, this is not reunification but *Anschluss*.

Of course, that's a word whose emotive resonances go far beyond the realities of the present. Perhaps *incorporation* would be better. But whatever term one uses to describe it, reunification is clearly an historical event that has a darker side to it. This is particularly true in its impact on relations between the different ethnic and religious communities of which Berlin consists. There are over 100,000 Turkish immigrants and their families living in Berlin, for instance,

'In the frantic struggle to master the nuts and bolts of unification, few people seem to be giving the overall picture much serious thought'

and east Germans in particular have shown massive racial prejudices and resentments against them – not least in the correspondence columns of the local press since the censorship system collapsed.

In a situation where unemployment is rising sharply in the east, and where growing numbers of east Germans are coming to the west to look for jobs, such racist attitudes are increasingly openly expressed. West Berlin's left-leaning, Social Democrat-green coalition government has so far failed to make good its promise of more rights to the Turkish community, and racist attacks by skinheads are now calling forth resistance in the form of Turkish youth gangs. The propensity of these to regard all Germans as 'Nazis' and thus fair game for revenge assaults is in turn further fuelling racist attitudes among the majority population.

The man I met chipping away at the Wall was himself a Yugoslav immigrant who – like many other immigrants – was out of a job. When I asked him how he was doing, he paused and shook his head.'Badly,' he said: 'Too much competition.' It was a feeling that many others in Berlin, east and west, must be sharing at the moment.●



Illustration: Michael Sheehy

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

To create a strong, united Europe we must be ready to bury our differences.

The first impression

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All of them?

***The*Second opinion**

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PREVIEW

Martin Pawley finds motor car design at the crossroads

Motor Showdown

Alpha Romeo SZ: Truly advanced

This year's Motor Show, opening at the National Exhibition Centre on September 18, must be the most ill-timed since the Earl's Court show of 1973 that coincided with the Yom Kippur War and the Arab oil embargo. Like that non-event of 17 years ago, this month's Motor Show will be showcasing an industry bloated by a decade of success but caught on the wrong foot by world events so that its products have suddenly assumed a Marie-Antoinette insignificance.

This year, once again, the most hyped cars at the motor show will look like dinosaurs caught in an ice age, for what on earth can now be said in favour of the 200mph Lamborghini Lotus Carlton or the bloated Dodge Viper weighing in at nearly two tons?

But while events in the Middle East have a great deal to do with the popular perception of the new crisis on wheels, they are by no means the heart of it. In fact they are only the topping on a rich cake of crises that the motor industry has been gagging on for some time. It was bad luck that the dull glow of trouble in the Middle East came along just before the Motor Show to illuminate it all, but the motor manufacturers and distributors, the used-car trade, the motor-magazine publishers, the classic-car collectors, the auctioneers, the car restorers and the vast, multinational, vertically integrated business that leads from oil wells to acid rain by way of the ubiquitous hatchback, is having a very bad time indeed.

For the first time since the repeal of the Red Flag Act, the motor car is facing the kind of popular and intellectual revulsion that, under the banner of the Prince of Wales, counter-revolutionised architecture after 50 years of modernism. With exquisite irony the built environment has turned against the species car just when its magical success as an industrial product makes the most advanced building in the world look like something off a 1913 Ford production line.

This turnabout is all the more galling because, from the very beginning in 1885, car designers got everything right that building designers got wrong. Car manufacture leaped from handcraft to mass production in 25 years and rapidly reached critical mass. Five thousand small-car producers flowered, then withered and coalesced until only a handful of mighty corporations were left.

In design terms both species, car and building, went through the same adventures in the present century, but their isms and wasms were differently ordered. In the early experiments of Daimler and Benz there was something like the pioneer modern work of the architects Frank Lloyd Wright and Adolf Loos, but with the Model 'T' Ford we leap straight to the mechanical expressionist or hi-tech phase – roughly equivalent to the recent work of Richard Rogers or Sir Norman Foster.

The 1930s saw the automobile designer learning the correct lessons from unitary, body-and-chassis-in-one construction in the aircraft industry as well as the advantages of streamlining, so that the motor car achieved a classic modern perfection by 1937 – in the shape of Battisto Falchetto's Lancia Aprilia – but buildings did not catch up until after world war two.

In the 1940s and 1950s architecture brought forth the predictive triumph of the 'prefab' and the Hertfordshire schools: but the same decades showed a distressing progress towards a kind of premature postmodernism in the design of automobiles. The motor car descended into the black pit of postwar giantism, culminating in the finned American monsters of 1959.

From this swamp of styling the motor car was only saved by the energy crisis of 1974; its design thereafter re-acceding to an enhanced 1937 utilitarian perfection with Giorgio Giugiaro's Volkswagen Golf and the anonymous Honda Accord. The industry too pulled itself together. Car manufacture globalised and ephemeralised at precisely the moment when the world grip of International Style modern architecture faltered and was discredited.

By the mid-1980s, after 100 years of development, the modern, short-life motor car had become as ubiquitious as the long-life Georgian house. Indeed, front-wheel-drive hatchback cars such as the new Ford Escort and Fiesta are the consequence of such a wonderfully convergent process of technological evolution that it is only possible for fanatics to distinguish between them and their competitors. What indeed is the difference between a Skoda Favorit from Czechoslovakia, a Lada Samara from the USSR, and a Nissan Sunny from Japan?

Motoring correspondents bewail the lack of 'character' of these cars, but they are a rampant species whose genetic frequency overtook that of buildings early in this century and is adapting to the powerful multiplier effect of mobile information technology. The sophistication and information capacity of such cars today even threatens to make buildings obsolescent. It is buildings that have to be demolished to make way for cars, not the other way around. And why not? When did you last drive a car with a leaking roof, or see a house with electric windows?

Alas, it is precisely that kind of assumed superiority that is under attack now. After bankrupting the railways, starving the buses, bridging over the ferries and turning the footpaths into extra lanes for their wheels, cars have finally used up roads too. At least they have in Britain where a £15 billion roads programme is only expected to delay terminal 'gridlock' from 2009 to 2025. Until then the prospect is one of increasingly severe congestion or restrictions on road access or both.

Apart from congestion, cars have also exhausted the patience of the green lobby by getting themselves into an unwinnable pea-and-thimble game of toxic emissions, where the fewer unburned hydrocarbons they release, the more carbon dioxide they give off, and the less carbon dioxide, the more oxides of nitrogen. And they

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can't escape from this by using electricity because, with the rejection of nuclear power, all the electricity they would need would have to be generated by fossil-fuel power-stations – and that would take something like three times our present base load. Nor do the more exotic alternatives like solar cells, methanol or hydrogen fuel make much sense yet. In the last case the fuel tank has to stay at -253°C or it explodes.

Motor manufacturers have tried to take all these criticisms seriously – or at least their public-relations departments have. Highly fuel-efficient cars were produced in the wake of the 1974 and 1978 oil crises, notably Japanese micro-cars and the German Volkswagen Polo Formel-E and the BMW 525E, both of which remained in production for a number of years, although they were not market successes. In Britain, for various reasons to do with 62% company-car ownership – and company payment for petrol – only a few self-employed or retired folk are interested. The same half dozen who were impressed by the 60 miles per gallon base model of the Rover Metro.

What Ford, General Motors, Toyata, Nissan and Fiat do is more subtle. They always have lots of environmentally responsible 'experiments' on hand for the media. Gimmicks like safety cars, recyclable bumpers or lightweight aerodynamic prototypes; low-emission cleaned-up two-stroke engines, hybrid petrol-electric engines, fun races between solar cars.

Because motor cars mean personal mobility, and personal mobility is a priceless freedom, the cycle of threats of regulatory action versus promises of technological breakthroughs is difficult to break. About the only thing that will do it is that very convergence of motor vehicle design that is so widely deplored by design critics.

Today the most truly advanced cars are not the designer extravagances of the Motor Show, but the anonymous mainstream products like the 'disappointing' new Escort, the Honda-cloned Rovers, or the inscrutable and undistinguishable Cavaliers, Sierras, Granadas and Carltons. As impossible to eradicate as cockroaches, they cannot be driven off the road by anything less than the total disappearance of gasoline which, in view of the importance of road transport, is about as likely as the disapearance of the royal family.

What mainstream cars offer, as design objects, is the possibility of a return to Fordist ephemeralisation so that cars cease to be exotic products of material culture and become again simple artefacts like ballpoint pens or quartz watches. To do this their whole system of design priorities must change. They must revert to being parts of a complete personal transport system that encompasses everything from infrastructure costs to raw material consumption, energy use, emission controls, parking systems and scrap disposal and recycling.

Ironically all that was achieved, with the rectifiable exception of poor exhaust emission controls, by a modest little vehicle that only ceased to be made this year, after a 26-year production run yielding 2.9m cars. But in the unified Germany the little east German Trabant 601 Saloon, with its top speed of 58mph, its two-stroke engine and its bio-degradable compressed paper body, is now to be replaced by real 16-valve German cars, like Volkswagens, Audis, BMWs and Mercedes.

Clearly the economical east German solution was just not good enough. But if any government today were to turn the clock back and try to plan a personal transportation system from scratch, what would be the best starting point for the mobile unit? Something like the little Trabant? Or an M25-full of 16-valve, twin-turbo 'collectors cars' with nowhere to go but the Motor Show?●

Chevrolet Bel Air: Fuel-guzzling freedom from the 50s

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FORUM

Child Benefits

From Jo Richardson MP, shadow minister for women

Malcolm Wicks (*MT* August) concentrates on the crucial need to provide a secure and happy background for children.

Bringing up children is a matter of great concern for us all – and for government. But government intervention should not be about trying to impose formal patterns of parenthood, and then wailing when people don't conform to them. It should be about creating the climate, and giving support, to enable people to decide on the best and happiest relationship within the family at all stages of life and through whatever changes it undergoes.

It is important to encourage men to take a proper share in family responsibilities – and a growing number do. But this won't happen in any meaningful way while we continue to believe that men are only men if they spend long hours away from home and women are left with the prime responsibility for the home, fitting a part-time paid job around caring for the family.

Women are struggling to achieve more at work than ever before, and they have a right to even higher expectations, quite aside from any opportunities brought by demographic changes. As well as a job which uses their considerable skills and abilities, women deserve recognition for the unpaid work they do in the home. They should have a real choice about taking a paid job and caring for their family and back-up in combining the demands of both. A realistic level of child benefit and a decent benefit for carers of elderly or sick relatives are crucial.

Why does Britain lag behind in upholding rights and providing services to help take the burden off women? Half of all pregnant women in this country do not qualify for the right to return to their jobs, yet working women in every other European Community country have the right to maternity leave. Almost half of all British women work part-time, yet, unlike women in other European countries, they are denied the employment rights of full-time workers.

Labour's 'Charter For Working Women' – to ensure that women are free from the obstacles of discrimination, that they are offered access, as young women and older women, to education and training and that they have the rights at work which have so long been denied them – is at the heart of our policies for families.

Ensuring a choice of good-quality childcare and support for carers cannot be left to a government which is ambivalent about what women's roles should be and unco-ordinated in framing policies which will help them. We have to have a Ministry for Women, to put a women's perspective at the heart of government policy and in turn give practical support for the family.

Families come in all shapes and sizes, and these shapes and sizes are constantly changing as people grow older. To ignore the central role which women play at every stage of their lives, by denying them support which would enable them to make informed choices, does not help to provide the secure, safe and harmonious family life that we all want.●

Precautionary Tales

From Brian Kennedy, who publishes Kennedy's Gay Guide To London and co-edits the 'Out' section of City Limits

Gilbert Adair watching men watching men (*MT* August) might have written a more insightful piece on gay male cruising if he had spent a little more time on Hampstead Heath and a little less on early 19th-century literature.

The unfunfilled yearnings of Mann's Aschenbach, Barthes and Forster may provide an interesting historical perspective on the dismal effects of closetry, but say little about the contemporary variant of male homosexual pick-up technique. Far from providing an 'apotheosis of homosexual passion', *Death In Venice* is interpreted by most gay men of my acquaintance as the bathos of homosexual prick-teasing – the infatuation of an older man for an unattainable pretty youth.

Before Mann turned the tale into tragedy (desire re-routed into a fatal but socially safe cul-de-sac) the psycho-mythological emblem might have been Michelangelo's shepherd youth Ganymede, transported to heaven by Zeus in the form of an eagle. Nowadays many gay men would probably prefer a Tom of Finland drawing of shared ecstasy between two semi-naked hot studs – if only Customs would stop seizing our 'heraldic motifs'.

Cruising is not a replacement for exchanged caresses but a sensible precautionary prelude, the quintessential motive of which is orgasm. Adair's confusion over this may owe more to his role of voyeur in the parks than to the psychodynamics of the participants.

The 'edgily standoffish distance' he reports between circumnavigating cruisers is more likely to be a commonsense reaction to the awareness that their 'obscure object of desire' may well be a pretty policeman; a queerbasher; into advanced sexual practices which could turn out to be painful; or an acid queen who learned his rejection techniques from old Bette Davies movies.

Delayed engagement in these surroundings is a survival technique, not a sign of avoidance of intimacy. Transport the cruising to the relative safety of late-70s bars, backrooms and baths and the behaviour is contracted, eye-contact leading rapidly to orgasm, courtship ritual reduced to a gruff, 'Wanna fuck?' Shift to the post-Aids expansion of telephone and video sex and even the cruising is dispensed with – stimulus to ejaculation in the ad interval between *International Athletics* and *Sticky Moments*.

Nor are gay men 'clinging to homosexuality as an offence'. It still *is* an offence, except in a locked room between two men who didn't plan it beforehand. Chat-up lines in public are called 'soliciting' in court records.

Adair's claim that we miss the 'tang of personal danger' is dangerous nonsense, particularly when gay-bashing seems to be on the increase. The recent protests over gay murders are not the signs of a community courting danger. But some are driven towards it by isolation, fear of public exposure and societal rejection. Let's put the responsibility for this squarely where it belongs and stop blaming the victim.

And let's also not forget that cruising is but one expression of homosexual desire. When in Rome do as the romance. And when in Venice, some enchanted evening, if you see a stranger 'to die for'... just remember, he probably squeezes the toothpaste from the middle.●

New Right Review

The interview with Ted Honderich (*MT* August) pleasingly demonstrates that *Marxism Today* does not totally ignore the importance of a rigorous analysis of the philosophical basis of the new Right.

Ted Honderich's powerful arguments (in *Conservatism*) for the parsimonious principle of equality are required reading for all on the left.

The responses of right-wing critics to his book leave no doubt but that he has exposed the raw nerve of conservative thinking: the unrestrained promotion of selfishness and an attempt to destroy the very notion of community.

It is only regrettable that the new Right has succeeded in transforming our ideological climate to the extent of making any defence of the principle of equality sound revolutionary. Even CAR Crosland's pungent writings in *The Conservative Enemy* (1962), with their identification of a socialist as one who seeks to give 'exceptional priority over other claims on resources' to overcoming poverty, distress and social squalor, now sound ultra-revolutionary. Let alone any case which might be made for the public ownership and planning of our basic industries.●

Richard Rawles, London

Rambo Rites

Who is Hilary Robinson (*MT* August) kidding? 'Disconsolate Glaswegians' no longer need to 'wait on Waverley station for the last train' from the Edinburgh Festival. Not this year anyway. Why bother with a 45-minute jaunt on the super sprinter when a 10-minute bus run goes to the centre of the European capital of culture?

Robinson takes a cursory, almost approving, glance at the Military Tattoo. Surely we are entitled to expect better? A little assistance, perhaps, in helping the radical and progressive elements in Scottish society get shot of this gawd-awful annual rambo rite of ritual tartanry with bagpipes, kilts, searchlights, Union flags and all the other appendages and adjuncts of a British Scotland that is passing from history.

This year, it is far more likely to be disconsolate Londoners waiting at Glasgow airport for the last shuttle, after attending the late performance of the Berlin Philharmonic.

These really are new times.●

Alan Clayton, Glasgow

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Religious Divisions

As a Christian minister, and an occasional reader of *MT*, I so often read articles reflecting a naivety about religion, expressing a negativism commonly associated with the Left.

Peter Davies (*MT* August), although providing an interesting article on the cult-like nature of some political groupings, writes: 'It is one of the functions of religion to provide comforting faith – that is, a system of certainties which prevent thinking – for those who otherwise might not be able to cope with their lives.'

An unthinking statement such as this suggests that I, as a Christian, have committed intellectual suicide by professing faith in God. I believe faith in God is not a matter of blindly following written codes, but understanding the nature of God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ. The assumption that faith is derived as a result of unthinking is not so. Further, I take exception to Mr Davies' assumption that, because I put faith in God, I cannot cope with life.

Such assumptions about religion and those who believe there is a God need to be carefully re-examined. If we believe in a pluralist Left, then we need to be careful that we do not offend those 'comrades' who are 'thinking' Christians.●

Reverend Cecil E White, Sheffield

Dreamtime

I had a very strange dream last night. I dreamed that the new *MT* carried advice in how to handle being taken to court over the poll tax and interviews with activists around the country who are leading this vital campaign.

Then I dreamed that the cover was about Arthur Scargill. Inside, articles by NUM miners explained how smears are regularly used to try to break union organisation and showed how they can be beaten. Next, *MT* carried a feature on the new IRA campaign and what we who want troops out of Ireland should be saying about it.

But then came the most ridiculous part: I dreamed that I took seriously the tirade ('Lenin's Crystal Ball', *MT* August) against 'the escapism of marxist cults'!

John C Mullen, London

Pensioned Off

Malcolm Wick's admirable article on the family (*MT* August) understandably concentrates almost exclusively on the younger generations. As usual in discussion of policy in this field, older people are mentioned only in the context of care: who is going to look after the growing numbers of aged parents? By implication, older people are members of families only as dependants.

It is extremely difficult to break down the attitudes which exclude older people from being considered as active members of society, as diverse and as changing as any other. Yet once you stop to reflect, it seems obvious that many of the issues raised in the debate on the family apply with equal force to older people. Just because they may be past child-rearing age (though older men, in particular, may well be fathers of young children) they are not considered relevant to the debate.

Dependency is only one of a number of issues. Older men and women are, it seems, reversing their labour-market positions. A higher proportion of women than men past the state pension age work full-time, and it may well be that older women are developing careers just as their husbands are withdrawing from theirs.

What does this do to their marriage? What kind of stresses are brought on by retirement and the prospect of living full-time together; in particular, how will this affect the divorce rates of older people? What types of contract can we expect or promote between older people and their grown-up children in respect of inheritances? And what sort of rights (and responsibilities) do grandparents have in relation to their grandchildren?

The Left has for too long either ignored older people, or confined its efforts to securing better pensions and better care. This is not only inadequate, it is also politically myopic.●

Tom Schuller, Edinburgh

Mutual Attraction

Maureen Freely (*MT* August), commenting on Sheila Jeffreys' *Anticlimax*, writes that Jeffreys is trying to promote 'a love relationship that is simultaneously safe and exciting'.

'Safe' seems to be Freely's interpretation of a relationship based on mutuality and equality, and here it appears to be in direct contrast to excitement. Mutuality, however, is not necessarily safe, but simply conducted from a more equal emotional base for men and women. This can encompass protector and protected, assertive and passive for both sexes.

Freely goes on to state that 'there is more to heterosexual sex then the struggle for power'. Precisely so. The majority of the time there is little struggle, as one partner (guess which sex) submits more often than not. Of course there is more to a heterosexual relationship than the sexual act. The eroticising of power difference within heterosexual desire does not originate in the sexual act, rather, desire, sexual or otherwise, permeates all parts of a relationship.

If mutuality as Freely sees it existing now enables partners at least to 'call a truce... and get the dinner on the table', I would like to know, at the risk of being pedantic, *who*'s putting dinner on the table?

Mutuality doesn't necessarily mean an end to argument or betrayal, but the destruction of the male 'ace in the hand' of desire and power difference.●

Sarah Hardaker, Brighton

Cartoon: Nick Newman

Gas Flaws

Tim O'Riordan makes a technical error (*MT* July) in dismissing the consideration of methane, as 'not easy to control'.

Some 20% or 30% of global methane emissions are fossil methane, released largely by the coal, oil and gas industries. About 30% of UK emissions come from domestic waste landfill sites. Agricultural sources are dispersed, but a good part can be traced to the use of fertilisers.

With up to 75% of the UK's methane technically controllable, why is the need for measures to restrict emissions so discounted? Naturally, the UK's chemical industry and agribusiness have a large stake in high-fertiliser and factory-farming methods. And the British state has promoted North Sea gas and oil production with minimal safety and environmental considerations.

Methane is a far more potent 'greenhouse' gas than carbon dioxide. When it is taken into account, there is no clear advantage in switching from coal to gas for electricity production, as O'Riordan states.

Those who still see value in marxist political economy are not surprised that production-ist interests manipulate arguments and information sources. O'Riordan's hope of 'global politicians buttressed by a global citizenry' will come to nought without real mechanisms for open, democratic and supranational governance. International monitoring systems and research programmes, independent of states and industry, must be developed, alongside machinery for international agreement on global problems.

The non-governmental environmental movements that are forcing the pace the world over have vital consultative and campaigning roles.●

Max Wallis, South Glamorgan

Editorial Note:

We welcome your letters to add to discussion. Please send them to *MT* Letters, 6-9 Cynthia Street, London N1 9JF. (Note that this is a change of address.) Brevity means you are more likely to be published. We reserve the right to cut.●

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Britain After The Cold War

Britain's Bless Trinity

The end of the cold war represe a huge trauma for Britain. **Martin Woollacott** explains how very identity is at stake

Britain faces an intense psychic problem as the cold war ends. Only the Soviet Union is undergoing a similiar crisis of identity. Our traditional image of ourselves, our very notion of how we are situated in the moral universe, is at stake. And in Britain's case, as in Russia's, we are talking of a crisis whose roots go back beyond the years of the cold war to the late 19th century when the roleplaying of modern nations began. Indeed it is precisely because they do, and because Britain's 20th century 'personality' is in the balance, that the crisis promises to be so severe.

Recent discussion has focused mainly on the ways in which Britain's high rank within Nato and the 'special relationship' with the United States have both inflated her world position and led to a persistent and damaging anti-European bias in her policies. There has also been some harking back to the last quarter of the 19th century when Britain first recognised Germany as her principal commercial and military rival, and wry comment on the way in which the new situation in Europe so harshly illuminates Britain's failure in that rivalry. But what has not been much investigated is the impact of these changes on the underlying ideas and myths that have sustained Britain in this difficult century – ideas and myths which constitute something of an informal religion. It is a tradition which in recent decades has even been remodelled in such a manner as to incorporate national decline itself in an emotionally satisfying way. It could almost be said that we British have become worshippers in a 'cult of decline'.

Our experience seemed to us to be, and our myth became: that there was a morally sanctioned international political order in the world for which we British had a special responsibility; that those trying to bring down this order had to be dealt with by the use or the threat of British military force; that this was typically done at the outside margin of our national resources, by the skin of our teeth, and by super-human effort; and that our struggles on behalf of the international order did not principally benefit us, but other nations, so that our role was truly a sacrificial one. In fact, precisely because we were bled white by the succeeding conflicts, we had to give up our place to others. In other words we sacrificed not only

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Frank Spooner Pictures

blood and treasure, but, stage by stage, our actual world position, and knew it, as it were, in advance, and yet still did our duty. This is what we might call the British 'Trinity' of Order, Sacrifice and Decline.

This altruistic, not to say masochistic, role was prefigured in the development of the 'white man's burden' strain in our imperial ideology. When 'ten thousand pounds of education' went 'down to a cheap jezzail', Britons saw the loss of Kipling's symbolic young officer – and all he represented in terms of national resources – as a sacrifice to maintain and extend all civilised order, not just to keep British control of north India. But it received its first full expression with the first world war, when the dominant note in British rhetoric, as opposed to German, with its images of breakthrough, escape and freedom, was struck in such phrases as these from Lloyd George in 1914: 'Fate has scourged us to an elevation where we can see... the great peaks we had forgotten, of Honour, Duty, Patriotism, and, clad in glittering white, the great pinnacle of sacrifice pointing like a rugged finger to Heaven.'

That sacrifice was to be made in defence of an international order which Britain had made peculiarly her own. It is of course widely understood that, as Paul Kennedy puts it, Britain in the mid-19th century was '*the* established world power, with less to gain than to lose from fundamental alterations in the status quo.' Britain 'had a built-in interest in preserving existing arrangements or at least in ensuring that things altered slowly and peacefully.' The British suspicion of change and even of progress was due to the perception that any shift after British society had reached its pinnacle of power and success was almost bound to be to the disadvantage of the country and its directing classes. Thus arose that opposition to industrial and technical change which historians have identified as both a reaction to economic decline and a factor accelerating it. And thus arose that proprietorial attitude to the international order which is still with us today.

The German challenge in the late 19th century sharpened the sense that the international order Britain was defending was a moral one. Modris Ekstein in his *Rites Of Spring* has described how Britain felt that Germany threatened 'the whole moral basis of the Pax Britannica... the British mission, whether in the wider world, the empire, or at home among her own populace, was principally one of extending the sense of civic virtue, of teaching both the foreigner and the uneducated Briton the rules of civilised social conduct... an ethic of moderation, of rational reform and rational restraint.' For Germany, Ekstein writes, the first world war was thus 'a war to change the world; for the British this was a war to preserve the world. The Germans were propelled by a vision, the British by a legacy.'

If, after the war, there was widespread disillusion with a 'Carthaginian' peace and a feeling that the order Britain had claimed to be defending could not possibly have been worth the slaughter that had ensued, the other two elements in the British Trinity were certainly present. Sacrifice there undoubtedly had been, on a scale undreamed of, and a loss of world position, in particular to the United States, that could be partially concealed but not truly denied.

The connection between order, sacrifice and decline was soon apparent again in the 30s. Clearly Hitler's regime was a challenge to the moral order of the most extreme kind. But by this time the British could see no way in which war would truly serve the British national interest. The chiefs of staff repeatedly warned that Britain's chances of winning a war against Germany, Italy and Japan – the war which ultimately came to pass – were not good. Victory, if achieved, might be Pyrrhic. Germany might be defeated, and yet Britain might not be victorious: in such anguished perceptions we can perhaps find elements of what was later to become the more fully worked out cult of decline. Indeed, although Britain emerged from the second world war to all outward appearances still a great power, her loss of position was soon apparent.

The sacrificial note was struck again first on the imperial front. The postwar retreat from empire began as an unavoidable cutting of losses in the subcontinent; it was not intended to go forward with the disposition of the rest of the empire as quickly as it turned out we did. But, rationalised as it happened and in retrospect, it was soon set in its place as another example of the sacrifice to order. As Margery Perham wrote during the war, 'The pride and achievement of the modern British Empire are that it has become in a certain sense a self-liquidating concern.' Britain gave up its control over a quarter of the globe, but by its management of the process of emancipation it ensured that its ex-colonies, even if they were far from being democracies, would belong to the 'free world'. While in practice military operations were often the result of British delaying tactics, they were all portrayed as aimed at keeping dangerous forces, communists and others, out of power. In Malaya, Aden, Kenya, Cyprus and a dozen other territories, Britons saw again the spectacle of British soldiers fighting not for British interests, but against the enemies of order: the rifle in the service of reason.

'In Malaya, Aden, Kenya, Cyprus, Britons saw British soldiers fighting not for British interests, but against the enemies of reason'

The preoccupation with the moral order and its defence ran across the political spectrum. It was Harold Wilson, after all, who said, as late as 1964: 'We are a world power and a world influence, or we are nothing.' The connections can be seen with clarity in the work of a Labour intellectual like John Strachey. In his 1959 book *The End Of Empire* he tackled the question of what national purpose should move Britain after the liquidation of empire. Dismissing commercial objectives, he writes, after quoting Trotsky on 'Belgianisation', that: 'Nations which have known empire may simply break their hearts if they do not find a higher ideal than personal enrichment by which to live.' So 'total commercialisation of the national life' is not Britain's way forward, although, he observes, it may be Germany's.

Having rejected materialism, Strachey then chooses to turn to the necessity for a strong defence in this discussion of national purpose. Logically it has no place at this point in his argument, since defence forces are instruments of purpose, not purposes in themselves. But 'a vigorous nation determined to play in its post-imperial period as significant a role in the world as ever... must main-

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star gazing



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

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

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

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tain... the best defences which it can afford.' Only then does he go on to discuss what might be called the expansion of the welfare state at home and abroad and to conclude that aid to the underdeveloped world is 'the highest mission of Britain in our day'. It is a clear example of how the British preoccupation with the moral order sits in close company with a preoccupation with military force.

Thus it was that the British believed that a role second only to the United States in the military organisation of the West against the Soviet Union was theirs as a matter of duty as well as right. The Soviet Union now took the place of Germany as the rogue nation that aimed to upset the international order. This was never a question of Britain hating the Soviet Union more than the other Western allies, or being more opposed ideologically to communism. Indeed, Britain had a marginally more relaxed attitude toward the antagonist than either the United States or West Germany. The explanation for Britain's continuing prominence was, rather, that Britain still maintained that *proprietorial* attitude to the international order. It was and is seen as *ours*, in a way that it is not Denmark's or even France's.

'The British mission, whether in the wider world, the empire or at home, was principally one of extending civic virtue'

The legacy of our position as the first real superpower, in other words, has remained with us. It has grown into a sustaining myth which, at different times, has mixed the three elements of order, sacrifice and decline in varying proportions. Through the five main episodes, of late-19th century empire, the great war, the Hitler war, the liquidation of empire and the cold war – to which we might now add Ireland – it has become increasingly marked by the notion that our relative decline is a product of our moral pre-eminence. It has co-existed with objective policies aimed at arresting decline and handing over responsibility for international order to others, notably the United States, and indeed with strategies for economic renewal. But policy has been powerfully influenced by this underlying self-image. Britain champions the world order; it champions the world order by force and in war; Britain itself loses position as a result of these successive sacrifices; other nations move to the top internationally, although there is some consolation in the primacy of the other Anglo-Saxon power, the United States; order survives. It is the story of St George and the dragon of chaos.

The concept of sacrifice for the sake of Order is one that has provided a pivot even for those who have opposed nuclear weapons and the whole concept of a strong defence. We can see how in the arguments over nuclear weapons the concept of Britain taking the moral lead, of standing at the moral centre of the world order, has informed the thinking of CND. This mirrored dissidence has been in some ways as delusive as the basic tradition. At least, one can say that it has been as uninterested in the real sources of national strength and as old-fashioned in its notion of Britain's moral primacy.

In this way a nation that in real industrial and military terms has been dwindling for a century has kept itself psychically at the centre of things, because even as its power has diminished, it sees itself as having applied what remains more and more altruistically to the needs of order. Indeed it sees itself as having sacrificed its power on the altar of international order. When Margaret Thatcher speaks, with force and obvious sincerity, of Britain's key part in the long display of military resolve that she believes led to the end of the cold war, the implication that others did not match our commitment, preferring to bend their main energies to self-enrichment, is inevitably there.

The fact that this contribution to the cold-war victory was being made precisely at a time when British competitiveness was eroding and Britain was slipping further down the economic league table underlines, in other words, how real a sacrifice it was. Of course at one very important level Margaret Thatcher would not concede that the British economy, under her management, has further declined. But at another the fact that a 'decisive' contribution to cold-war victory was made by the major Nato state least able to make it, Britain, is very much in the sacrificial tradition of which Margaret Thatcher, for all her preoccupation with economic matters, is very much a part.

The policies shaped by that tradition can be modified or discarded. Our defence forces can be cut, although not yet by enough, and even our nuclear deterrent might be traded off, under another government. We may take a more realistic view of our relations with the Americans; we may make a greater commitment to the European Community. The underlying tradition, which has permeated both high and popular culture and which touches even the youngest generation, is a different matter. Young and old, at any rate, are likely to experience the collision of that tradition with new realities as a void, an emptiness where the nation's sense of self should be.

It used to be said that when you heard the word 'burden' you knew at once that what was really being talked about was self-interest. From the 'white man's burden' period on, Britain's myths of course related powerfully to the national interest. The order was one that favoured us, the sacrifices were made to preserve it. The crisis we now face follows changes in that international order which have, in crude terms, reversed a century of British effort. The newcomer nations of a century ago that Britain opposed – Germany and Japan above all – have nevertheless achieved world power. The newcomer nation that Britain tried to co-opt, the United States, has played a pre-eminent role for a much shorter period than anyone expected. In that role, in any case, Britain was only dubiously associated as junior partner.

The order has changed in other ways. The most important supranational organisation for Britain is one which she played little part in creating and of which she is a late and reluctant member, the European Community. Long before Gorbachev, the reality of international life was at grave variance with Britain's policies and her myths. With the reunification of Germany it can no longer be argued that the international order is in any sense British, or that we have any special responsibility for it.

Nor is the order under threat now from antagonists who must be deterred by force. The characteristic British combination of a proprietorial attitude toward the international order with a readiness to take a leading part in its military defence has become wholly obsolete. As for the emotionally satisfying, if largely untrue, notion that our decline has been in part a result of our championship of order, it too is no longer tenable. Decline, particularly economic decline, must now be seen for what it is, not as a kind of stigmata of our suffering on behalf of others.

'By the skin of our teeth,' wrote Strachey 30 years ago, 'by good sense and good luck, somehow or other, we have been saved from the fate which has overtaken most nations which have lost their empires. We have not suffered that searing succession of national defeats, frustrations and humiliations which habitually mark the decline of empires.' That has so far been true, although not for the reasons Strachey believed at the time.

Instead the Trinity of Order, Sacrifice and Decline has provided psychic support for the whole nation. A tradition binding us to our 19th-century past, it has given us a morally central place in the world even as our real power has diminished. There are, of course, elements of truth in it. Truth and tradition have combined, in any case, to give us a strong basis for self-respect, and for expecting and receiving the respect of others. When Chancellor Helmut Kohl met Ridley's insults with a reference to Britain having 'staked its national existence' on opposition to Hitler, he spoke to that tradition. But we cannot for much longer operate on the basis of Britain having a special and sacrificial mission on behalf of order. What was acceptable, and to some extent true, at one time, is now unacceptable. What was honourable once was already threatening to tip over into a maudlin mixture of self-pity and self-aggrandisement. What was still internationally a possible role is now at sharp odds with reality. Without dishonouring our past, we desperately need to make a psychic new start: we must cease to worship at the shrine of the British Trinity.●

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Britain After The Cold War

A Farewell To Arms

The cold war is over. The raison d'être of Britain's bloated defence expenditure has evaporated. Talk of a peace dividend is in the air. But there is no debate and little action. **Paul Rogers** explains why

In the dog-days of the parliamentary year last July, Tom King finally made public the Ministry of Defence's private defence review – *Options For Change*. Facing a considerable challenge from the Treasury for severe cuts in defence spending this autumn, his aim was 'to get his retaliation in first' and come up with some relatively modest defence cuts which would stymie the Treasury in its desire to part-finance a pre-election spending spree through defence cuts.

The end result of the MoD's efforts was much as expected. A series of relatively modest cuts is proposed for the next five years which entirely fails to match up to the changing realities of European security. Britain will cut its armed forces personnel by around 18%, but only over a five-year period. The cost savings will be much more modest, probably no more than 10%, and they will not be immediate. The so-called 'peace dividend' of defence savings supposed to result from the ending of the cold war will be modest in the extreme as Britain adapts its armed forces for a more flexible and wide-ranging role towards the end of the century.

Compare *Options For Change* with developments elsewhere. Last year the Soviet Union cut its defence budget by 5% and much larger cuts are under way: Gorbachev is probably aiming to cut defence spending by around 50% by the late 1990s. Already in central Europe the pace of change is quite staggering. Czechoslovakia is cutting its service personnel by 30%, Hungary by 35% and Soviet troops are being withdrawn from both countries. A sixth of the Soviet forces in Poland will be gone by the end of the year and the GDR armed forces are already down by 35% on last year's figure. Germany as a whole will, within two years, have armed forces down by 40% on last year's combined total. In the United States, an intense defence debate is under way, with severe cuts in weapons programmes being announced weekly, and most serious analysts regarding 30-50% budget cuts as attainable within the decade.

In Britain, by contrast, the MoD fights a rear-guard action to preserve our defence budget at close to current levels. Set against the wider background of Britain's postwar defence posture, *Options For Change* is yet one more example of the chronic failure of Britain's defence planners to come to terms with reality. Britain remains a country which still entertains delusions of post-imperial grandeur and has, for 40 years, financed a defence posture which has been way beyond its economic capabilities or security requirements.

Carlos Guarita/Select

For most of those 40 years, Britain has spent considerably more on defence than most of its leading industrial competitors. France, West Germany, Italy and especially Japan have maintained lower defence burdens, and West Germany and Japan in particular have ploughed far fewer resources into military research and development.

British governments have, on rare occasions, embarked on serious reviews of defence policy, but these have usually been 10 or 20 years late, trying to get the defence posture down to a size consistent with the economic and political realities of a previous generation. Duncan Sandy's post-Suez review of 1957 and the Wilson government's reductions of the late 1960s were examples of this attempt to face up to reality, but each was short-lived and new projects quickly materialised. For the most part, successive governments until 1979 continued with policies consistent with an illusory great-power status. If the relative size and speed of Britain's response to the Kuwait crisis is anything to go by, this attitude looks set to continue.

Under Thatcher, defence spending actually rose rapidly in the first two years. John Nott then attempted to institute a defence review which would have involved cutting the navy's surface fleet, but the Falklands war intervened and the Galtieri-Thatcher axis saw to it that the Royal Navy was preserved in all its historic glory. Defence spending only levelled out in the mid-1980s but now, with the cold war ending, even the MoD has to acknowledge that cuts are possible. Their aim is to do their level best to keep them small and take as long as possible to implement them while seeking out new roles for our armed forces.

In recent years Britain's defence posture has covered a huge range of functions. Apart from maintaining quasi-independent nuclear forces, Britain has kept a substantial army and air force in West Germany and has had Nato responsibilities for the naval and air defence of much of the northeast Atlan-

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tic and North Sea. Forces have been committed to the defence of the UK itself, including a major role in Northern Ireland, and there have been the continual 'out of area' activities, a relic of our hankering after a world role.

Those last activities have been wide-ranging and expensive. They include maintaining Fortress Falklands, a substantial naval patrol in the Persian Gulf, garrisons in Gibraltar, Cyprus and Hong Kong, frequent 'showing the flag' naval deployments around the world as well as numerous training missions throughout the Third World.

This level of defence commitment is exceeded only by the superpowers – no other country attempts so much, let alone on the basis of a declining industrial economy. Now, though, Britain's major Nato commitments are rapidly diminishing. The major part of Britain's defence posture is related to countering the Soviet threat and, with the decline of that threat, scope for radical defence cuts increases rapidly, certainly at a much greater rate than that proposed by *Options For Change*.

BAOR and RAF Germany illustrate this clearly. As the major part of the recently announced cuts, BAOR will be halved and the RAF will lose several squadrons of planes in West Germany, both over a five-year period. Even then, though, the army will still have substantial armoured forces in place, and the RAF will maintain four squadrons of deep-strike Tornados, all ready to defend us from the dangerous new democracies in eastern Europe.

Bearing in mind our current excessive defence commitments and the progressive demilitarisation in eastern Europe, there is scope for huge cuts, with forces in Germany going down to, at most, a nominal presence and most other forces being pruned severely. Over a five-year period, the navy and air force could be halved in personnel and equipment and the army cut by even more. All three armed forces could move to more defensive postures but with a relatively higher proportion of reservists for future contingencies. Even these drastic cuts would still leave UK defence spending at above the European average by the mid-1990s and would still leave room for unexpected eventualities such as the Kuwait crisis.

Over a longer time scale, around 10 years, and providing that the European security situation continues to improve, Britain could eventually cut its defence forces down to barely 30% of the current figure. With a current defence budget of around £21 billion per year, a budget scaled down to little more than £6 billion a year by the end of the decade could yield cumulative savings of up to £100 billion over a 10-year period. This huge bonus is of a similar order to governmental earnings from North Sea oil in the 1980s, spectacularly wasted in financing Thatcher's consumer booms while the UK industrial base continued its steady decline.

Defence cuts of this level, over a 10-year period, should result in little unemployment for ex-service personnel, most of whom have technical skills which would be snapped up by civil industry with its worsening skills shortage. There would be problems for industry without planned conversion and diversification programmes, but a government willing to intervene in this process could do much to ease the difficulties.

Many have argued that the peace dividend should be used in improving health and social-security provision. Others see the priority as development assistance to eastern Europe and the Third World. While part of the dividend might be so used, the majority should clearly go on the redevelopment of Britain's industrial base, including the decrepit transport infrastructure.

Britain's deteriorating industrial performance will be at the root of its security concerns, especially in post-1992 Europe, and industrial regeneration will be a far greater contribution to security than maintaining a crippling defence budget, even if this does require central government involvement including direct investment and fiscal incentives. We can even make a virtue out of a necessity – using Britain's recent lack of industrial development as an opportunity to produce industries appropriate to an environmentally-constrained future and ahead of their competitors.

'Britain's deteriorating industrial performance will be at the root of its security concerns, especially in post-1992 Europe'

Whether the British political system is up to this kind of radical change, involving severe cuts in the defence budget *and* a major role for central government in industrial development, is certainly debatable and is complicated by our entering a pre-election period. In the short term, it is probable that the Treasury will succeed in imposing further immediate cuts in the defence budget, sufficient perhaps to yield £3 billion over the next 22 months. This will be used entirely to fill the election coffers, helping to meet poll tax problems and with some spending in the more high-profile aspects of health and education.

The recent argument between defence procurement minister Alan Clark, wanting quite radical defence cuts, and Tom King and the MoD bureaucracy seeking far more modest decreases, is illuminating. Thatcherism seems torn between a 'head' which knows that immediate defence cuts are politically sensible and could aid an election victory, and a 'heart' which still hankers after international status and sees strong defence forces as a means to this end. In the run up to an election, the 'head' should win.

If Thatcher does win the next election, defence could then, even under the Tories, still come under the axe to an even greater extent than Tom King and the MoD would like, but this will probably be to enable the Tories to continue selective hand-outs through into the mid-1990s. The possibility of their reversing all their remaining free-market ideas and embarking on government-led industrial regeneration must be remote unless, of course, our post-1992 economic situation is so dire that, even for them, there is no alternative.

Any post-election Tory defence cuts would be fought hard by the service chiefs and defence industry, and these are powerful and entrenched interests, yet it is easier for a Tory government to cut defence, as they can hardly be accused of lack of patriotism. Moreover, such a government in the mid-1990s will probably be facing severe economic circumstances, plumbing new depths of electoral unpopularity. In these circumstances, even the might of the defence establishment could be insufficient to hinder the exercise of political pragmatism.

Moreover, a Conservative government would cushion the blow by maintaining strong nuclear forces, claiming, as in the past, that nuclear weapons represent a cheap way of enhancing security. Trident would certainly survive in all its might, and there would be considerable emphasis on the new tactical air-launched missile for the Tornadoes.

Labour is traditionally more reluctant to take on the defence establishment, always fearing charges of unpatriotic behaviour, and its experience in the 1983 and 1987 elections simply heightens this fear. Its recent performance clearly indicates a preference to keep defence policy at the lowest possible profile in the run-up to a 1992 election. While this may be easy to understand in party-political terms, it explains the remarkable lack of a proper public debate on defence policy in Britain, in stark contrast to several other countries, especially the United States. More importantly, it means the loss of a remarkable opportunity to present a powerful vision of a Britain embarking on industrial regeneration.

If Labour wins in 1992, it will have little option but to institute radical defence cuts, using the savings principally in industrial redevelopment, unless, of course, it is only planning on being a one-term government.

Labour is thus left with an opportunity and a responsibility in the run-up to 1992. Its opportunity lies in the hope that the Treasury will indeed start the process of making serious defence cuts, but that Thatcher will fail to win the election. This will make it politically much easier for Labour to institute a radical defence review after the election, although it will still face the deeply entrenched power of the defence establishment.

The responsibility is two-fold. It entails serious, if low-profile, planning for the post-election implementation of a policy of industrial development, but it also requires the promotion of a wider understanding of the needs of national security in the 1990s. Above all, this means the recognition that security in the post-1992 Europe will be much more related to industrial competitiveness than military power.●

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The Buck Stops Here

Citizenship and the environment are two key themes of the 90s. **Geoff Mulgan** argues that 'responsibility' is the third theme which challenges both the Left and the Right

Every few years new themes erupt into politics. They are born out of crises, out of a sense that politics isn't answering the really important questions. Not having obvious ideological anchors, they become the objects of intense competition between parties and movements anxious to make them their own, to lay claim to historic and philosophical affinities. In the 1990s there are two prime candidates for appropriation. One is the environment. The second is citizenship. Both have begun to displace older arguments about nationhood, efficient macro-economic management, meritocracy and industrial harmony. Behind these two, however, there is a third theme, a meta-theme. It can be summed up in a single word: responsibility.

Having become a dull and dusty word, perhaps a bit too pious for the late 20th century, responsibility is again being invoked by people as diverse as Vaclav Havel, Prince Charles and Jesse Jackson. Strong commitments to an ethos of responsibility can be found in the feminists' comparison of the male lust for power without responsibility and the caring spirit of reproduction and nurture, and in the green slogan about thinking global and acting local. In the rhetoric of corporate responsibility it is being used, sometimes cynically, by businesses eager to show their commitment to community. In Douglas Hurd's 'active citizenship' and Chris Patten's failed attempt to introduce green taxes there is evidence of the Right's unease with the irresponsibility of 1980s Thatcherism.

These arguments about responsibility resist easy appropriation. They are neither obviously right-wing nor left-wing.

They challenge both the unfairness and amorality of the market and the diffusion of responsibility brought about by large-scale industrial socialism. They suggest that the world's deficits of responsibility can be solved only by linking a strong individual ethic with a new affirmation of what it means to live as part of a community. There is a special reason why these arguments are pressing for the British Left. Although it has begun to convince that it can offer material well-being, a more balanced and whole prosperity, and although it has come to feel more in season than the Right, the Left has found it hard to occupy the moral high ground. It still lacks something of a moral centre and still remains vulnerable to the charge that it lacks principle and substance.

Across the world three historic crises have forced these issues on to the political agenda. The first has been the collapse of communism. A large part of its failure was practical, an inability to make things work. But equally important was its failure to be responsible, either in the sense of being accountable to those on the receiving end of decisions or in the sense of having an ethos of responsible behaviour. Instead, power corrupted and absolute power corrupted absolutely. Marxism-leninism offered no guidance as to how individuals should use power, or about their standards of truth and propriety. As a result many of the most magnetic ideas in the East today come from those who assert the obligation of the individual and community to truth and responsibility. Havel, Sakharov and Fang Lizhi have all invoked high standards of personal behaviour as a starting point for any credible politics. All have denounced the way a totalitarian, corrupted and amoral society corrodes any sense of individual responsibility.

The second crisis has been that of the environment. The green movement calls to account the responsibility not only of politicians and industrialists but also of the human species. Humans are held to bear responsibilities to other species and to life itself. A retreat from industrial civilisation is justified on the grounds that only then can human power be brought into line with humans' capacity to use it responsibly. Meanwhile, in its more immediately political forms, the green movement has successfully called for regulations and taxes to make the polluter pay, for a more responsible ethos of consumption and for the state to impose responsibility on to those who cause damage. The political and the personal are seen to be intimately linked, and one of the great appeals of green ideas is their claim that the individual can act in practical, everyday ways, rather than waiting for states to find collective solutions.

The third crisis arises from the legacy of Reaganism and Thatcherism. Responsibility was always an important element in neo-conservative rhetoric. It underpinned the claimed moral superiority of the Right. The Left could be characterised as spending without earning as creating dependency and sapping the self-responsibility of people and communities. It could be shown as engaged in a perpetual search for alibis, blaming every ill on society or others. Under socialism the buck would never stop

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Illustration: Paul Bateman

'The Right has failed to convince that its policies for increasing responsibility are more than a weak apology for cuts in public services'

The Right promised that it would reverse the irresponsibility of socialism by reducing people's dependence on the state. Margaret Thatcher's proud boast of her first administration was that it had achieved a shift away from a state which was 'totally dominant in people's lives and penetrated almost every aspect of life to a life where the state did do certain things, but without displacing personal responsibility... .'

Ironically it is now the arriviste Right that seems the very acme of irresponsibility. Far from raising standards of behaviour, Thatcherism and Reaganism brought a serious decline. An expansion of individual freedom for some was not balanced by a sufficiently strong sense of social duty. Far from ushering in a more responsible society, the Right created the conditions for greed, indifference and carelessness to flourish. The result has been both a political and a moral crisis for the Right. It has failed to square its libertarianism and its conservatism. It has failed to convince that its policies for increasing responsibility are more than a weak apology for cuts in public services. And it has failed to forge a true 'moral majority' behind its programme.

These three crises, of communism, of the environment and of the Right, present both opportunities and dangers for the Left. The opportunities arise because a sense of mutual obligation is central to why most people think of themselves as socialists. It is the moral core of socialism as personal credo, as opposed to the socialism of scientific analysis and world-conquering movements. It is what carries the Left to the moral high ground. The dangers come from the fact that the Left still shies away from the implications of a strong ethos of individual responsibility. It still feels more comfortable concentrating responsibility in the hands of the state and of remote collective institutions. It is still ill at ease with the suggestion that socialised forms can dissipate responsibility as much as the market. It is still ambivalent about arguments that emphasise ethos and morality over structure and interest, universal values over political economy.

These problems have not been solved by the Left's recent shift away from an inflexible statism towards a more libertarian and permissive stance. If anything they have been exacerbated. By concentrating too narrowly on the need to devolve power and on the virtues of freedom, issues of responsibility have been pushed to the margins. This is all too apparent in today's fashionable code-words. The words 'enabling', 'empowerment', 'citizenship' and 'consumerism' promise a dispersal of power away from an oppressive and monolithic state. State power is to be broken down and distributed fairly. Citizens are to be given clearly-defined rights.

As a result of this new rhetoric of enabling, Right and Left now speak remarkably similar languages. Where

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the new Right suggests granting people entitlement in the market, the Left proposes to give them powers through local democratic institutions or constitutionally guaranteed rights. Where the Right offers tax cuts, subsidised council-house sales and utility shares, the Left offers regional assemblies and citizens' rights, training credits and denominational schools. The exchange has gone in both directions. But while the Right has learned the power of libertarian radical-democratic and populist arguments, the Left the organisational virtues of markets, both have lost something. Both have become embarrassed by moral arguments. Both have come to see power as a commodity that can be distributed and parcelled up, the state as a body that can choose to give this or that section of the population units of empowerment. Once received, power is simply there to be used. A Santa Claus state dishes out powers without making demands on those receiving them. Left and Right compete as to the attractiveness of what is to be distributed.

For parties to be engaged in a competition to wither away the state is certainly novel historically and not without its attractions. But amid the celebration, difficult questions are coming to the surface. There is widespread unease about the implications of a more fragmented, heterogeneous world. A broken-up state in a broken-up society seems to imply an inevitable loss of universal solidarities and mutual responsibilities. There is unease that the Left's ideas about citizenship should end up as nothing more than a package of rights without obligations, a programme for a loose society in which relationships are contingent and undemanding. This despite the fact that many are asking whether, to paraphrase John Kennedy, the question is not what the community can do for you but what you can do for it.

I shall come back to these questions later. At this stage it is enough to reflect that each step towards dismantling the state is deeply ambivalent. The Right often seems to want to devolve responsibilities without distributing the power (and the money) to bear them. The Left often seems to want to devolve power while silently assuming that the state still bears the final responsibility for outcomes. Both, meanwhile, are sometimes less than honest about the fact that each step towards decentralisation helps to solve the state's legitimation crisis precisely because it allows government to absolve itself of responsibility. Whitehall walks away, and politicians find a perfect alibi. Having privatised and devolved, they can simply shrug their shoulders and say, 'None of my business,' when something goes wrong.

This is also true of reforms to the machinery of government. The new Right used to argue that the classic impulse of politicians and bureaucrats is to build empires. Yet throughout the 1980s, states of all political stripes have happily divested themselves of functions. Recent studies offer an explanation. Like the modern corporation, the most rational and perceptive modern bureaucracy aims to maximise its power and minimise its responsibilities. To do this it slims itself down to a strategic core and hives off all operational functions. While maintaining strategic control and all the perks of power, it too can shrug its shoulders when anything goes wrong.

The dangers of an imbalance between power and responsibility also apply to the individual, and to the question of freedom. The last year has seen an orgy of praise for freedom. Left, Right and Centre justify their actions as expanding the realm of freedom. It is the one unquestioned ideal, with almost no visible enemies outside Beijing, Baghdad and a few other forsaken places. This is in almost every way a good thing. To anyone living under alien tyranny there is nothing more important than freedom. It is a pressing, almost palpable need. It is the necessary condition for life itself. But come the revolution it turns out that while freedom may have been a necessary condition it is sufficient for nothing. It doesn't give any clues as to how to behave to others; how to share; how to think; or how to feel. It tells us nothing about judgment, about right or wrong. It simply defers from the social to the individual all the big problems. At its worst the rhetoric of freedom represents the conquest of meaning by vacuity.

Few today use that clear distinction between freedom and licence, between freedom, and freedom to do the right thing, that dates back to St Augustine and beyond, and that makes a link between politics and personal morality. We now assume that the only worthwhile freedom is the freedom to do wrong, freedom without restraint. This may be the curse of an era that still lives in the shadow of utopian ideologies. Utopias maximise freedom. They never maximise responsibilities, though it is arguable that the bearing of responsibility is as much an end of human potential as the exercise of freedom. In this sense utopias are childlike. Like the worst demagogues, they promise without demanding.

Marxism shares all these weaknesses. It has been notoriously silent on the problems of power and freedom. While much of its intellectual labour went into detailing the manifold forms of power, economic, ideological and cultural, it was easy to succumb to the utopian belief that in the future power could be eliminated and replaced by freedom without compromise. If the end is a society without power, states and mediating representatives, then there are no problems of responsibility.

The one realm where the Left has consistently spoken a language of responsibility is around accountability. This idea has a long history. The democratic and later the socialist revolution promised to bring power into line with responsibility and accountability. Instead of the caprice of kings and the indifference of bankers, public actions would be open to scrutiny and judgment. Anyone exercising power would have to stand or fall by their record. Government would become accountable and transparent, responsive and responsible. Those on the receiving end of power would have a chance to know what was done in their name.

There are still strong echoes in today's Left. Freedom of information acts, co-determination in companies, democratic accountability in local affairs, in education and public services, can all be counterposed to the accretion of invisible and (literally) irresponsible power by national government, transnational companies and organisations. This is all to the good, especially in an opaque society like Britain. It remains true that there are far too few lines of accountability, whether within firms, between service providers and users, or between planners and planned. It remains true that the continued modernisation of socialist ideas depends on finding appropriate forms of accountability in work, welfare and government.

'In the USA it is possible to sue a doctor or lawyer for outcomes that in another society might be ascribed to bad luck'

The problems arise when answerability works in more than one direction. We might all agree that the powerful should be answerable to the powerless. But should those without power be answerable to each other, perhaps when they pollute, when they take each other's jobs, or when they choose a distinct lifestyle? And should the individual be accountable to the community or the state, the employee to the employer, the young to the old? Here a libertarianism that leaves the individual with no obligations looks like a cul-de-sac. It leaves community as contingent, social responsibility as nothing more than an effect of free-floating conscience.

Much of the policy debate of recent years has been shaped by the fact that the new Right thought it had an answer to precisely these problems. Their answer, which is still influential on political discourse throughout the world, can be summed up in two words: private property. According to the theory, property rights provide the best means for creating a responsible society. This applies as much to the home-owner as to the small business. The democratic component of popular capitalism is that owners are accountable to themselves, not others. If there are enough owners then society becomes more democratic, but without the built-in irresponsibilities and upward bidding of electoral democracy.

Meanwhile, the same market which empowers also restrains and disciplines. To extend its virtues, the public sector is sold in parcels, public goods turned into private ones. Cento Veljanovski's book on privatisation re-

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

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flects the theory in its title, *Selling The State*. The rationale is that the property owner takes the long view, conserving and husbanding resources. By contrast the individual who shares a tiny part of a collectively-owned good has little immediate incentive to value it. According to the theory, property inculcates care, collectivism carelessness.

These ideas are attractively simple. But their very simplicity makes them unbalanced. For while it is true that while anyone living by the laws of the market has to spend only what they earn (within admittedly broad limits), to plan and to care for their assets, it is equally evident that all markets bring strong incentives to evade responsibilities: to pass costs of health, training and environment out on to the community, and to devalue the future that is left to later generations. Property rights seem to foster care within narrow limits only at the price of carelessness in relation to the rest of society.

These are not the only reasons why a property-based market is an inadequate foundation for a responsible society. Today's markets are not like the face-to-face ones of the past. Their complex global interconnections make it hard to see the links between decisions and outcomes. Producers and users, owners and employees, investors and managers, are distant from each other, and the rhetoric of popular capitalism hides a reality in which ownership is extraordinarily diffuse. The opacity of modern capitalism undermines its claim to responsibility. It is easy to evade responsibilities. It is easy to justify a decision by reference to abstract market forces. And in one of the worst symptoms of an irresponsible system, it is easy for the provider of an amoral product, whether a dishonest newspaper or an addictive drug, simply to blame the public which demands it.

These contradictions between ideal and real markets do much to undermine the Right's case. But from a philosophical point of view there is a much more basic reason why market-based theories of private property fail to offer a convincing vision of a more responsible society. Responsibility is both etymologically and philosophically a social concept. It means, literally, 'answerability'. It is an idea born of the assumption that people live in communities and that they answer to each other. It fits much better in a worldview that recognises that collectivities have identities, aspirations and memories, a worldview that accepts that there is such a thing as society, than it does in a philosophy founded on the separate and selfish individual.

The remainder of this essay draws on these roots to suggest how the Left might begin to construct its view of a more responsible, and self-responsible, society. These are sketchy notes rather than a complete or wholly coherent vision. But they do at least suggest a path we might choose to follow. We could start with four basic principles. The first is that responsibility can be good for you. People are social as well as individual creatures. They often find themselves through groups and collective identities and through the obligations these entail. What marks out the socialist tradition is the belief that responsibility to others brings out the best in human nature. The political problem is to tap people's desire to be responsible in the same way that the economic system taps their more selfish desires for material well-being.

'The Right is a prisoner of the unbalanced enterprise culture of the 1980s that smirked at the idea of civic obligation'

The second principle is that the buck has to stop somewhere. The challenges and dangers of responsibility are inseparable from its benefits. Unless we ask individuals and institutions to carry the can for their own actions we will soon slip into a world of alibis and evasions. If responsibility is diffused we can assume that irresponsible action will follow.

The third principle is that we should favour individual responsibility where possible, but collective responsibility where necessary. Without a strong sense of mutual obligation, without a sense that the community can help people to take responsibility for their own lives, society runs the risk of sliding into mutual indifference. Without collective provision, principles of individual responsibility can simply translate into policies that pile responsibilities onto the weak.

The fourth is that, wherever possible, the political system should seek to establish a congruence between power and responsibility. It is hardly progressive to distribute responsibilities to the powerless. And it is not sustainable to distribute power unless those exercising it are responsible for how it is used. These principles represent a possible starting point, not a destination. They suggest the questions to be asked of policies and programmes, rather than the shape these would take. Nevertheless, it is possible to suggest where they might lead.

At a personal level, they might imply criminals being required to compensate victims; individuals granted training and education credits, and greater control over planning work, education and retirement. They might imply a greater devolution of control over services, as in the Danish model where parents are entitled to a fixed sum for organising their children's schooling. The City's monopoly over pension funds might be breached by giving individuals the right to use some of their accumulated pension assets to invest in friends and relatives.

At the level of the neighbourhood, these principles might imply collective responsibility for cleaning, childcare or lighting, and direct contractual relationships with service providers. They also suggest strict environmental auditing and payments by firms which produce excess waste and pollution; clearly-defined obligations for firms to stakeholders other than shareholders; and, as is already the case, laws making unions liable for the effects of disputes. Going further, one could imagine companies having clear contractual obligations to their workforces as a whole, covering such things as employment security, training and health. In the public sector, utilities or council departments could be made directly liable for their failure to deliver a service, with management salary levels directly tied to performance. Investors could be required to share some responsibility for the actions of those they finance. Tax laws could discourage capital from skipping from industry to industry, always seeking the effortless exit.

In welfare we could ask of any reform whether it really does create the conditions for people to escape dependency. If it is simply a guise for cutting funds like many 'Workfare' schemes, and like the restructured social fund, if the independence it offers is not practical and useable, then it should be opposed. If on the other hand it enhances people's human capital, and their access to the means for an independent life; if it gives both responsibility and the power to use it, then it should surely be supported.

There are also implications for government itself. One is that there is a need for restraints on governments' power to create money, to spend in the short term and to respond too readily to the upward bidding of democratic politics. If government acts irresponsibly, whether in monetary policy or in the conduct of its ministers, then it is hard to expect the rest of society to adhere to high standards. Self-restraint is essential if the Left is successfully to answer those on the Right who would turn the state, in David Stockman's vivid words, into nothing more than a 'spare and stingy creature'.

The list could go on. There are questions about how empowerment can be made meaningful for women who bear the greatest burden of domestic responsibility; about the full range of environmental responsibilities, from waste reduction through to the obligations of drug companies; about moving towards a system of payment according to responsibility. None of these issues is simple or one-dimensional. Any programme for fostering a more responsible society immediately runs into tensions, not least the age-old tension between freedom and equality. Granting neighbourhoods the responsibility for managing their own litter collection, or granting regions autonomy over economic decision-making could rapidly lead to heightened inequalities. A stronger collective sense of mutual responsibility may ease these tensions, resolving them, as it were, on a higher plane. But they do not disappear. Each step towards greater diffusions of power and responsibility brings risk and danger. Each step makes freedom into a weight as well as a release.

The ideal of a more responsible society lends no easy answers. It doesn't offer a simple map to the moral high ground,

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not least because there are now many moral high grounds, and because any ethos of responsibility appropriate to a plural society must respect the distinct responsibilities of the doctor, the teacher, the journalist, the police officer and the parent. But such an ideal does at least point in the right direction. It does at least pass moral responsibility away from the great institutions and back to a more human scale.

To the sceptical socialist I would offer three very different reasons why, difficult as they are, these questions cannot be fudged. The first is that it is precisely the most powerful institutions which are most immune to responsibility. No convincing radical programme can leave them untouched. Most governments have guaranteed themselves an extraordinary panoply of immunities and barriers against redress. Limited companies have done the same. Since the invention of limited liability in the mid-19th century, the licensed irresponsibility of the capitalist enterprise has been beyond question and there is only one real relationship which involves responsibility, the relationship of directors and shareholders. All others, whether workers, consumers or those polluted or inconvenienced, are simply bystanders.

There was a time when the labour movement took the view that if you couldn't beat them it would be better to join them. At the beginning of this century the trade unions won many legal immunities. Most of these have been taken away during the 1980s while those of the firm and those of the professions, which regulate themselves precisely to limit the danger of them being held responsible by the outside world, remain largely intact. The labour movement could seek to go back to the days of state-sanctioned privilege. But it would surely be more astute, and more in tune with the times, to argue instead for a removal of all unjustifiable immunities.

The second reason for not shying away from the difficult problems of responsibility follows from the first. The same impulse to protect privilege with immunities also lies behind the phenomenal spread of insurance: the idea that mistakes and misfortunes can be planned against and paid for in advance. In the free market it is now possible to be insured against anything from damages claims to libel. In the USA it is possible to sue a host for allowing you to get too drunk to drive safely, and to sue a doctor or lawyer for outcomes that in another society might be ascribed to bad luck. Under the sway of the actuarial table responsibility is replaced with probability. Uncertainty is replaced by calculable risk. Insurance is not in itself a bad thing. It was one of the building blocks of the welfare state,. It is one of the signs of a civilised society that people can defend themselves against adversities. Allowed to run rampant, however, insurance always tends to favour the strong over the weak, the rich over the poor. Allowed to run rampant, it undermines the very idea that people are responsible for their actions.

'In the USA it is possible to sue a host for allowing you to get too drunk to drive safely'

The third reason for taking these questions seriously is that it is hard to imagine any viable future for socialist ideas unless they can be answered. If socialism isn't rooted in some notion of what makes people tick and of what makes communities work together, then it is hard to see how it can remain distinct from any other political tradition. If it is just a more generous shopping list of citizenship rights, then it is hard to see why people should believe in it, rather than just voting for it. It may be politically rewarding simply to promise a progressive extension of freedom. But it is not legitimate to claim that such a position is socialist, or that it tells us how shared values can be upheld and how we can avoid the contingency of a society in which, to use Albert Hirschman's distinction, exit always takes the place of voice.

The Right has flunked its historic opportunity to win this argument. It has turned out to be a prisoner of its own history, of the interests that sustain it and of the unbalanced enterprise culture of the 1980s that smirked at the idea of civic obligation. The challenge for the Left in the 1990s is whether it can assert a convincing vision of a more responsible society, or whether it too is a prisoner of its own vested interests and of its own past.●



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Clinging To The Wreckage

A Conversation

The events of 1989 have shaken the marxist grand narrative of history. **Stuart Hall** and **Fredric Jameson** pick up the pieces of the post-modern epoch

Fredric Jameson is William A Lane Professor of Comparative Literature and director of the Graduate Program in Literature at Duke University, North Carolina. Internationally recognised as America's most notable marxist intellectual and a leading writer in the area of literary criticism, his works include *The Political Unconscious, The Prison House Of Language* and *Marxism And Form*. He also established a prominent position in discussions of postmodernism with his now classic essay, 'Postmodernism, Or The Cultural Logic Of Late Capitalism'. His book *Late Marxism*, in which he argues for the relevance of Adorno's work to the contemporary situation, is published in September by Verso.

Hall In 'The Cultural Logic Of Capital' (*New Left Review*, 146, July/Aug 1984), where you characterise what is now called post-modern culture, you assume a direct correspondence between capitalism and culture: 'Bourgeois culture corresponded to the era of organised capitalism – what Lenin called "imperialism".' You suggest that we are now moving into a new epoch, in which 'late capitalism' finds its correspondence in what people have designated as 'post-modern culture'. Is that still your position?

Jameson The problem with talking about 'bourgeois culture' is that one of the things one wants to posit about this epochal change is that the culture of the bourgeoisie has itself been destroyed by it. What we have now is a relatively anonymous systemic culture, in which it becomes as problematic to talk about ruling classes in the old way as it does about some of the other questions. It might still be useful to talk about those things, but one has to address all of the objections first.

When talking about postmodernism, it's more important to ask, what exactly were 'classical modernism' and 'high modernism'? I've found it useful to explore the idea that modernism was a response to a modernisation in the West from, say, the mid- to late-19th century until the second world war. It was a response to a modernisation which was incomplete, and in which the modernised enclaves and forces themselves were still working against a background of older class situations, older forms of agriculture and, in some parts of Europe, even older aristocratic strata, which the second world war finally disposed of.

So the real difference between postmodernism and modernism is that postmodernism is a situation of tendentially complete modernisation in which those older remnants have been

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removed.

Hall Is one sign of what you call 'tendentially complete modernisation' the penetration of many of the elements previously associated with a rather exclusive 'high modernism' into everyday life, into popular culture, into consumption?

Jameson Absolutely. I would call it the plebianisation of culture: the way in which much larger sections of the public now consume culture on a regular basis and live within culture in ways that they didn't have the occasion to do before. That's a crucial part of postmodernism, which underscores its ambiguity. One cannot object to the democratisation of culture, but one must object to other features of it. Those mixed feelings have to be preserved in any analysis of the postmodern.

Hall You have talked about postmodernism as being more systemic. Can we still speak of this as a 'class culture' in the old sense?

Jameson It is really only a class culture in the older sense when one is looking at it from the outside, from the perspective of the non-West. Then I think the terms we used to use, like 'cultural imperialism', are absolutely relevant, and indeed postmodernism would be a synonym for that. It is essentially a North American culture which is exported and implanted by way of media technology and so forth. If you're looking at it from this other perspective then it's very clearly a matter of domination at least, if not an immediate matter of class.

But from the inside that domination wouldn't be so visible, partly because what's systemic about it is not due to anybody's agency. We don't have a dominant class sitting up there and conspiring and doing it to us any more. It's being done to them too. And obviously there's a certain way in which, for a lot of people, it's not unpleasant to have postmodernism done to you. It's a very elegant thing. One cannot think of it in terms of ideological control in those older ways.

Hall You've talked about modernism as a response to a particular restructuring, a reshaping of capital in the period of imperialism up to the second world war. But it's hard to see postmodernism as a response, because that suggests critical distance, the ability to reflect back on and challenge. Modernism contested. It shocked, it scandalised, it challenged the taste of the Victorian and Edwardian bourgeoisie. Now postmodernism isn't doing that. It doesn't have that reflexive, critical distance from what is going on in the economic and political system. It seems fully integrated into the system, part and parcel of it. Is that the case?

Jameson That's absolutely true. Modernism with its claims for the autonomy of art and its ideology of the genius and so forth still reflected a situation in which there were certain entrepreneurial possibilities. Certain oppositional or critical cultural forms emerge only when the economy is not yet too standardised and there's still room for both individual entrepreneurs and the same kinds of agents on the level of culture.

That's much less the case now. This is a period in which there is a genuine collectivisation of people's lives at either end of the economic and social spectrum: the great multinational corporations on the one hand and the collectivisation of all the oppositional groups on the other. So, for example, you no longer have that great North American notion of the 'lonely rebel' who challenges society. There aren't any lonely rebels any more because they're all organised in some way or another. They have mailing lists, they have their societies of lonely rebels. That itself makes a difference to the way cultural production is felt and to the relative anonymity and systematic quality of this way of being secreted by the economic rather then being produced in opposition to it.

Hall I think there may be an American/non-American difference of emphasis here. You talk about these visible forms of collectivisation and incorporation – the corporate character of post-modern culture. Whereas in Britain, perhaps because we're on the periphery of it, the transition feels slightly different. Of course, one can't ignore the fact that the whole economic and cultural system is much more organised, much more managed, much more regulated, much more rationalised. Everybody is plugged in, at some level, to those forms which only the corporate culture of late capitalism can produce.

But, paradoxically, this seems to have produced a new form of individualism. In terms of style, for instance, it seems that for the first time the ordinary 'entrepreneurial individual' can make a difference. The corporations have to watch him/her very carefully indeed, because in a sense they are too large and cumbersome to catch the fluent rhythms of modern consumption styles. They have to respond quickly to what's

Jameson: '1989 was the result of the passage of the eastern countries into a new world system that has become visible in the last 10-15 years'

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going down on the streets.

Jameson You're talking about music...

Hall Music and style and dress. Exactly where ordinary people, without necessarily knowing the name, live the postmodern. Maybe they don't have much sense of what it is in the system that is creating these openings, or how constrained they are. Undoubtedly what is experienced, and ideologically constructed, as freedom, may not necessarily be freedom at all. But it does lead to a sense of difference. It's as if the era of mass production and mass culture has now yielded, not standardisation, but a proliferation of difference, of otherness. Corporations don't advertise to a mass public any more. It's now niche advertising – addressing the subtle differentiation between one consumer public and another, exploiting cultural fragmentation.

Obviously, you need to get to a certain level of massification before this is possible. This is difference after massification, rather than the old style of 19th-century individualism. But it is as much this return of individualism and difference which strikes people here about postmodernism as its collectivisation, anonymity and systemic quality.

Jameson This is absolutely part of the change-over. But we must remember that massification, 'Fordism' and the standardised products also went along with the individual rebel. That is what allowed revolt, as well as all of the other ideologies, such as authenticity and so forth, that we associate in a positive sense with the modern. What you describe is the way in which the economic system itself, in a post-Fordist way, has now become a machine for differentiation. In a way, North America was the place for this new moment at its purest, because there were fewer forces of tradition and resistance and less of a past to destroy. I imagine that after 1992 you'll be drawn into that.

There's a linguistic problem with this concept of difference. The conceptualisation of difference would not have been possible in situations of real difference. In an imperial system, where colonised peoples are really radically different from their metropolitan overlords, there's no great political merit in affirming those differences. The political, cultural concept of difference is paradoxically based on a conquest of a certain equality and identity among the social subgroups. It would not have been possible until the moment where there was less difference.

Hall Do you mean that the language of difference becomes much more common when we're all operating on the same plane, even if we only do so very unevenly and unequally? The balance of forces is not the same in the so-called Third World as it is in London or Paris or Bonn or New York. But these are no longer – if they ever were – separate worlds. They belong within the same increasingly 'global culture'.

Jameson Yes, although it's useful to separate the question of global difference from that of what goes on within a political entity like a nation-state, just for the purpose of keeping things clearer. I've found it very interesting that, in cultural life and in the university, postmodernism emerged virtually simultaneously with a whole new interest in what we used to call Third-World literatures, post-colonial literatures.

There really is a fit between those things, which have to do with a certain kind of global standardisation. Standardisation, again, is both a good and a bad thing. And it makes me wonder how many illusions are present in the appeal to difference when, even if the logic of the system is differentiation, by producing difference it is producing a new form of standardisation. Indeed, the whole logic of postmodernism is that: a new way of seeing identity as difference, which we wouldn't have been able to think or express very well in an older period.

Hall You said earlier that the cultural democratisation which we associate with postmodernism is both positive and negative. Now you say the same thing about global standardisation. But isn't this exactly the problem with 'a post-modern politics': trying to guess whether its negatives out-weigh its positives? You've got to take a wager on whether what is going on in the postmodern is simply a dominant system producing marked differentiation as part of its own logic of domination: or whether there really has been a shift, representing the power of the marginalised or subordinated cultures and people to make what you called, earlier, a real difference. If the system is producing this differentiation as part of its own logic, then the 'logic of history' in a classical marxist sense is still operating, while going through one of its many epochal changes. On the other hand, many people – as you know – read these changes as representing the suspension of the 'logic of history' – as the end of the meta-narrative of classical marxism. Are we still in the same kind of game?

Jameson Some of the problems that I'm having in talking about this may come from the notion of stages, which I'm anxious to keep. But I think the problems also have something to do with what we call the dialectic, and they were present in the way Marx described capital from the very beginning in *The Communist Manifesto*. It is both absolutely positive and absolutely negative and to understand it we ought to be able to think those two things together, or somehow speak them together in a single sentence. But we can't, so we keep waffling back and forth between describing the positive things and then remembering the negative ones. The politically positive aspect about what you've been describing is the fact that subgroups have been able to attain a certain collective existence that they didn't really have before. That clearly fits into a kind of cultural commodification on the part of the industries that now have a new submarket and produce new things for it. But the crucial thing would not be those badges of cultural difference, it would be the fact of collectivity.

Hall: 'There no longer seems to be any one enemy, any one source of power'

Hall But don't those two things – cultural difference and social solidarity – play against one another? Look at feminism, which came forward in the name of some collective category – women – and of their collective experience of marginality and secondariness. But the women's movement has very rapidly been cross-cut by differences between one feminine experience and another, one category of women and another.

Exactly the same thing has happened in relation to the diasporas. At one period in Britain, the term 'black' unified them across their cultural differences. But now the cultural differences begin to re-emerge and that makes black politics very complex. Our sense of agency on the left has always depended on a sense of coming together: solidarity – not just the lonely rebel individual. But it's exactly that sense of totality, of collective action and solidarity, which has been undermined by the new logic of 'difference' which dominates the era of the postmodern.

Jameson My feeling about politics, which may be an old-fashioned one, is that nothing finally happens without the reconstruction of a certain basic unity among groups. My own sense of this may be too pessimistic, but from the perspective of a politics of solidarity, culture would not be a substitute for politics. It would rather interfere with it. If the various sub-groups invent powerful cultural symbols of their separateness, then it's much harder for them to get back together. I am more pessimistic about a purely cultural politics than I would obviously like to be.

Hall But isn't there a problem nowadays about identifying the common programme around which those solidarities could be organised? What we've been describing is a space where a lot of active politics in society is going on; but there's a discrepancy or gap between the old political parties and their programmes, which are lodged in an earlier political and cultural space. Those programmes don't reflect the life-experience, the cultures and the points of antagonism of the emerging social forces. And the social forces themselves are so divided and subdivided around different projects that it's not possible to see any single overarching programme that could unite them. This is the problem of hegemony in the age of the postmodern. There's also a real suspicion, among these new social subjects, of submerging the things that mobilise and activate them by lodging them inside some grander programme, that will probably eventually submerge and forget all about them.

Jameson Nobody could begin by inventing a whole programme, but the

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first step in any solidarity between groups is the sense that, however different they are and however differently they are victimised, they all face a common situation dictated by what used to be called the ruling class. It's better not to call it the state any more, I would say 'the corporate' would be a good word for it, in the multinational and business sense, for one way or another the corporate is not a ruling class of the older type because of what's happened to individual agency. That's how one begins to create an alliance of groups.

Hall The disappearance of a unified agency, like 'the ruling class' or 'the state', as the instrumentality of oppression presents its own difficulties. It requires us to produce a much richer picture of how that 'corporate' force operates. There seems to have been a randomisation of what it is that makes people victims, a collapse of any one enemy or any one source of power, a multiplication of the centres of power. The dispersal of what used to be called 'the enemy' into a whole system leads to the difficulty of putting together any kind of common oppositional politics.

Jameson The other great stumbling block is the fact that the corporate is now at one with culture, so that to identify this agent that doesn't seem to be there would really require passing through the mediation of culture itself. That for me really dramatises what's at stake in this whole question of postmodernism and its critical analysis. Identifying the postmodern as a unitary logic is part of the process of trying to locate this agency, which seems invisible and fragmented somewhere within 'the corporate'. A politics that wanted to take on the corporate would, therefore, have to take on postmodernism itself and its corporate culture. That's a very complicated thing to do and it's something which often strikes people as being puritanical or oversimplified because you then seem to be repudiating all of the postmodern as a form of decadence and ruling-class culture, when it's a much more ambivalent thing, with a whole lot of new things being created within it.

Hall I want to put all this in the context of what's happening in eastern Europe. You may say that 1992 is a fulfilment of the system you're trying to describe. And presumably 1989 opens the way for everybody to be netted in that system. The Second World will be netted, the Third World is already netted; post-modern culture will be everywhere. There will be a new phase of the cultural globalisation of capital.

That may be to come in eastern Europe. But what is the explosion in eastern Europe itself about? It has its own local, historical specificity and, within that history, there's something paradoxical about the fact that it is 'democratisation' which seems to have given it its most powerful impetus to change: an idea of democracy almost lost in the West. Democracy has been so assimilated to liberal democracy and liberal capitalism in the West that we find it hard to get very excited about it. It seems to keep things in place rather than change them very much. But in the East, they really got excited about democracy.

Jameson: 'It is wrong to say that socialism was a failure. A new stage wouldn't be taking place if it hadn't been successful'

For the moment, the only way to describe the revolutions of 1989 is in terms of the democratisation of civil society or some such terminology. So, both in postmodernism and in the explosions in eastern Europe, some underlying tendency towards the 'democratisation of society' seems to be emerging. Have you had any thoughts about that in relation to the explosions of 1989?

Jameson I hesitate to use the word 'democratisation' because it implies a conquest that has not yet happened. It hasn't happened in the West either. Democracy must involve more than political consultation. There must be forms of economic democracy and popular control in other ways, some of them are very problematic, like workers' management. That has not been achieved, so it's important to separate the democratisation of culture from the achievement of real popular control. There are some permanent political dilemmas that don't vanish with the surface changes. Now in the East, I think it's very plausible to compare this to the revolution of 1848 in that it was not so much the economic that was at stake, but the national.

My other sense is that 1989 was really the result of the passage of the eastern countries into a whole new world system that has been becoming visible and organised in the last 10 to 15 years. It is wrong to say that socialism was a failure. It was a success in those countries. They wouldn't have this situation without near completion of the modernisation process that was always the final motive of leninism. One can have very different views as to whether that leninist moment of modernisation is the same as marxism in general. But a new stage wouldn't be taking place unless socialism had been successful.

In those circumstances, where a group of countries is essentially cushioned against the world financial market against trade and so forth, questions about efficiency are most often political questions. But the minute that global capitalism sheds the older skin and organises itself in a far more powerful and systemic global way, suddenly, these countries and their national plan and their modes of life, which function fairly well in the old system, are radically modified. If they want to be part of the world market suddenly their factories and their currency are worthless. The dialectic of this is that suddenly they were swept away partly because of their own success and partly because they're now a component in a much vaster system with which those relatively old-fashioned forms of socialism or communism are just no match.

Hall The analysis that you offer, both of what's happening in the West, in late-capitalism as you define it, and of the contradictory developments in eastern Europe, is very challenging, putting together many puzzling elements in a new way. You respond to the postmodern in a very flexible, complex way. Yet underneath that is an absolutely unquestioned faith in the logic of classical marxism. How do you keep these two things going simultaneously? Confidence in that particular grand narrative of history has undoubtedly been weakened, by everything that we have been describing. The fact that so many things have turned out differently from how that logic was projected at some time in the past has led many people to say, we just can't hold on to it any longer.

How do you manage to go on thinking new situations in a fruitful and novel way, while the underlying logic of your argument remains grounded in exactly the texts that were used to tell such a different story – the revolutionary nature of capitalism, its dialectical quality in producing its own negation, the proletariat, in *The Communist Manifesto* and the *Grundrisse*?

Jameson That's a question that's obviously hard to answer on the basis of individual belief or conviction because it could just be an aberrant personal religion of some sort. But the components of it have to do with the absolute conviction that this is still capitalism in the classic sense. Postmodernism has this odd double standard where you're convinced that capitalism has triumphed: there's the market on the one hand and everybody's better off and everybody plays their different music, but on the other hand we're also equally convinced that there's incredible misery in these societies, they're getting worse rather than better, people are not getting more prosperous. And we know both things are true and also that they are incompatible.

Hall The social fabric has disintegrated.

Jameson Exactly, and the new global wealth and the new global immiseration are true simultaneously, but somehow we can't put them together. As a grand narrative, marxism compensates for the fact that, as biological individuals, our own lifespans don't correspond to historical rhythms. Vaster historical movements are always astounding and unexpected, and yet from some larger systemic perspective after the fact, seem plausible again from what we know about the way the history of capitalism works.

I'm convinced that this new postmodern global form of capitalism will now have a new class logic about it, but it has not yet completely emerged because labour has not yet reconstituted itself on a global scale, and so there is a crisis in what classes and class consciousness are. It's very clear that agency on the Left is not there in those older forms but the marxist narrative assures us that some form of agency will reconstitute itself and that is the sense in which I still find myself committed to the marxist logic.●

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Movement In Motion

The 80s were a bad decade for the trade unions. **David Metcalf** discusses whether the 90s will be any different

Caricaturing only slightly, there are two basic views concerning unions and their activities. The *Financial Times* stance, elaborated by four distinguished labour editors in the last five years, states that there are 'growing doubts over unionism as members continue to drift away' and that 'union membership [has] become an irrelevance'. Furthermore, unions' response to their crisis of membership has lapsed into 'arcade unionism' – plastic cards and cut-price car insurance having displaced traditional collective concerns.

By contrast, the orthodox, but not universal, academic view argues that 'the evidence is overwhelming that Thatcherism did not change the institutions and procedures of British workplace industrial relations... workplace trade unionism did rather well in this period.'[1]

There is some truth in both judgments. The TUC lost one third of its membership in the 1980s. But most employers who recognised unions at the beginning of the decade continued to do so at the end. Equally, both tenets are partial. The academic view – mainly held by those on the left – is complacent, too eager to tell the unions what they want to hear. And the *FT* way of thinking is too deterministic, implying unions have little or no control over events.

Which view will prevail? Where will unions end up by the year 2000? The distinguished labour historian Henry Phelps Brown has no doubt: he has recently written that there has been a 'dissolution of the labour movement... the counter-revolution of our time'.[2] If this is so, private-sector unionism will be ghettoised by the end of the century – confined to a few large workplaces in northern Britain. The US provides just such a vision of the future. There, only one private-sector employee in seven is a member of a union.

The thesis in this article is that unions' fortunes will be determined by how they interact with employers. The state also plays its part by either supporting or undermining collective bargaining. But attempts to recruit individual non-members, and concern by unions for their own structure and organisation, are very much of secondary importance. The future of the labour movement is largely in the hands of the employers – but unions can themselves influence how employers behave towards them.

At present, two in five employees belong to a union. This is no mean achievement given the environment of the 1980s. The union movement has faced an onslaught against collectivism and a haemorrhage of jobs in its manufacturing heartlands. Yet at the end of the decade density levels (the percentage of employees belonging to a union) remained higher than those among our main EC partners. Even so, British unions face some daunting problems.

The labour movement has just suffered its longest ever sustained decline in membership. The TUC lost nearly 4m members in the 1980s. Although the fall in membership (from 12.2m in 1979 to 8.4m in 1989) was shallower than that between 1920 and 1933, at least then the membership loss was not inexorable – union numbers rose in 1924 and 1929.

Public-sector members now provide the bedrock of the union movement. Around two thirds of employees in state corporations, government services and local authorities are union members. By contrast, density in the private sector is now below one in three. In recent years membership has fallen hand in hand with the declining proportion of employers that recognise unions. Recognition of unions for collective bargaining by private-sector employers is the fulcrum of all unions' fortunes in the next decade.

TUC documents set considerable store by recruiting 'free riders'. They state that there are 3m to 4m people who do not belong to a union but who are in a workplace where one or more unions are recognised for bargaining. This is true but it is misleading. Many among the 3m to 4m are non-manuals in a workplace which only recognises a manual union. The true number of free riders – those benefiting from union efforts on behalf of their bargaining group who are not themselves members – is around half the TUC figure. So these free riders are only a small fraction of all non-unionists. The vast bulk of non-unionists are in workplaces with no union recognition. These employers – in private services and hi-tech manufacturing – have got to be converted if membership is ever to recover.

The decline in union membership in the 1980s was the result of a complex interaction of five factors: the macro-economic climate, the composition of jobs and the workforce, the policy of the state, the attitudes and conduct of employers and the stance taken by unions themselves. So if we look at these elements – the juxtaposition of Thatcherism with long-run trends unfavourable to unions – we get clues about whether or not unions have a future.

Record levels of unemployment in the 1980s obviously contributed to the decline in membership. But according to these so-called business-cycle theories[3], the recent halving of unemployment coupled with the slowdown in real wage growth should have given a fillip to membership. This has not happened.

Similarly, changes in the composition of jobs and the workforce play some part[4]. But emphasis on such trends as the reason for the decay in unionism is a seductive oversimplification. Those who advance such arguments reason as follows: the likelihood of being a union member is higher for men than for women, for manuals than non-manuals, in the north than the south and in manufacturing than in private services. As employment trends have all been unfavourable to unions we should not – so the argument goes – be surprised at the contraction of membership. Such reasoning begs the question. These trends were all in evidence in the 1970s, yet membership rose then. The question is: what can unions do to sign up non-union employees in the expanding sections of our economy?

The legislative onslaught against unions is a third explanation advanced for the ebbing of membership[5]. Statutory recognition procedures and the closed shop have been outlawed, immunities reined in and the definition of a trade dispute narrowed. There is undoubtedly something in such an explanation, although the industrial relations legislation probably reflects, as well as caused, the weakness of unions. If anti-union labour legislation is a key factor in their decline it can be given an optimistic interpretation by unions. A government more sympathetic to unions could pass legislation to support collective bargaining and, by implication, this should boost membership.

These explanations of union fortunes based on macro-economic variables, the composition of the workforce and legis-

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

Table 1

Trade union membership (thousands)

Source: Department of Employment 'Gazette', TUC



Table 2

Trade union density among employees in employment, Great Britain, 1988/9 (percentage)

Source: Calculated from Labour Force Survey, British Social Attitudes Survey, Certification Officer data.

lation, have merit, but they neglect the main actors – the behaviour of unions and employers.

Unions must get recognised in non-union workplaces and must make sure they do not get de-recognised. International evidence shows employer conduct is the key. Union-busting tactics in the US have marginalised unions there. By contrast, in Sweden and Australia the commitment of employers respectively to corporatism and arbitration has sustained membership.

There are two routes for a union to get recognition. Under route one, costs are imposed on non-union firms. In the west Midlands in the 1960s, non-union firms were simply told that they would get no deliveries unless they recognised the TGWU as the union for their own drivers. At the end of that campaign, most transport drivers were indeed TGWU members. Alternatively, and more likely in the current climate, under route two the employer is offered a carrot. The controversial single-union, no-strike deals – mainly associated with the electrical union EETPU – provide the best recent examples. In return for recognition, often after a beauty contest among competing unions, the employer is offered job flexibility and a promise to settle disputes via arbitration rather than strikes. Although these deals attract a lot of media attention, they still cover fewer than 100,000 workers.

Where the union is recognised for bargaining, the union must make sure this continues. De-recognition has not been pervasive, being mainly confined to newspaper and book publishing and shipping. Survival tactics in the face of prospective de-recognition require some swallowing of traditional collective pride. In particular it will be necessary to negotiate locally if national bargaining fragments. The TGWU dockers refused to negotiate locally with Tilbury employers when the National Dock Labour Scheme ended last year, and promptly got de-recognised. By contrast, the National Union of Seamen – chastened by their experiences with P&O – have just agreed to local negotiations with ship owners in place of national bargaining.

Efforts to get recognised have probably been made even more difficult by the present emphasis on the performance of the individual and the company. Richard Price, executive director of the CBI, recently stated that, while collective bargaining is not a 'complete evil', nevertheless 'employee relations increasingly feature the culture of the individual'. Similarly, Norman Willis, general secretary of the TUC, is worried that some 'good employers' are 'killing by kindness' in their attempts to forestall unionisation by promoting the ethos of the individual.

The likelihood of recognition or de-recognition is determined in part by the link, if any, between union presence and corporate performance. Union members receive higher pay than comparable non-unionists. There is no evidence of a corresponding offset by way of a higher level of labour productivity in unionised workplaces. Thus profitability and financial performance tend to be superior in non-union companies.

If such lower profitability is merely a matter of income re-distribution away from capital towards labour, many would say 'so much the better'. However, if it feeds through into lower investment and a worse jobs performance in the union sector, that is a serious matter. There is little evidence yet for Britain on the consequences of this lower profitability, and what little there is has caused fierce debate among econometricians.

Stopping de-recognition and gaining recognition requires both union voice and co-operation in order to sustain productivity growth and improve corporate performances. They are complementary. Voice without co-operation prolongs old-fashioned adversarial industrial relations. Co-operation without voice turns the union into the employer's poodle. Voice elements might include training, flexibility on working time and jobs, monitoring the application of collective agreements and legislation and social planning associated with restructuring. The EETPU deals are the best-known example of combining voice and co-operation. But most other unions are now engaged in such initiatives.

'Recognition of unions by private-sector employers is the fulcrum of all unions' fortunes in the next decade'

The state plays a pivotal role in setting the framework in which unions and firms operate. In the 1980s, collective labour organisation degenerated because the state no longer promoted collective bargaining and because legislation kicked away the props to union security provided by the closed shop.

The decision of the Labour Party last year to abandon its traditional support for the closed shop got massive media coverage, yet a far more important policy stance set out in the Labour Party's *Looking To The Future* has gone virtually unremarked. It states that the right to recognition will be enforced where substantial support for it exists in the workplace. Clearly, 'substantial' has yet to be defined. And some decisions have to be taken on whether the recognition procedures should be adversarial as in the US – where employees vote on the issue, usually in the face of management hostility – or via conciliation through a third party. The European Social Charter, which provides the inspiration for Labour's policy, also emphasises employers' duty to bargain with their employees.

Statutory support for recognition is probably the single most helpful thing that the Labour Party could do for the unions. It could transform their dealings with employers and herald a new era of co-operation between the firm and trade unions at workplace level. Corporatism at national level – 1970s-style – will never return. But greater participation by workers and their representatives in factories and offices, in deciding the fortunes of their organisations, is a definite and welcome prospect.

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

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As well as dealing with employers, unions must continue their efforts to recruit non-members, though this should have a much lower priority than forging links with employers.

Opinion polls show that unions are presently as popular as they have ever been in the 30 years of questioning by Gallup. Equally, non-union employees are very content with their lot. The *British Social Attitudes Survey* for 1989 reports that 86% of non-union of employees believe that there are good management-employee relations at their workplace and nearly two thirds believe that their pay is 'about right or on the high side'. In the face of such satisfaction, can unions get non-members to join up?

The TUC has given considerable thought and support to recruitment campaigns, but early evaluations of such a campaign in Trafford Park, Manchester have not been encouraging. In their recruitment efforts, individual unions are emphasising the private benefits of membership – cheaper car insurance or credit for example. They would almost certainly do much better if they emphasised the collective egalitarian benefits that result from their activities. The distribution of pay among union members is much less dispersed than among non-unionists. More importantly, union activity compresses the wage structure between women and men, blacks and whites, the less skilled and the skilled and the disabled and the able-bodied. Unions truly wield the sword of justice.

Unions' own policies can also influence membership. The TGWU expanded in the 1960s and 70s by decentralising and making greater use of shop stewards. In the 1980s the Royal College of Nursing trebled its membership – it is now one of the top 10 unions – by emphasising its craft and professional ethos.

The prime organisational issue now is mergers. Twenty TUC affiliates with 4m members are presently in merger discussions. Mergers offer a more cost-effective way to boost membership of the union than recruitment campaigns. Paul Willman of the London Business School has dubbed this 'market-share unionism' because mergers do not raise aggregate membership.

Not all the proposed mergers make sense, but some do. If the proposed new public services union from merging Nupe, Nalgo and Cohse comes off it will have greater bargaining power with local authorities and it would help maintain recognition in a decentralised NHS. And in the print industry the proposed merger between Sogat and the NGA would end years of competition and hostility between the two.

John Edmonds, leader of the GMB, has suggested that there will only be five or six 'super-unions' by the end of the century. It is not clear what the attractions of this proposal are. It would do little to reduce multi-unionism in the workplace. Research at the London Business School also suggests that economies of scale in mergers are elusive. And many groups would lose their craft identity.

'Statutory support for recognition is probably the single most helpful thing that the Labour Party could do for the unions'

Will the labour movement really have dissolved by the end of the century? Or will it stagger on like it did in the 1980s? Or perhaps surge forward, repeating the 1933-39 regeneration which followed over a decade of decline? Trends in the composition of the workforce are certainly not helpful. Macro-economic factors sometimes help and sometimes hinder. Mergers make little difference one way or the other. The crucial factor is rather how unions deal with employers, which is determined in considerable part by whether the state will provide props for collective bargaining. Another decade of Conservative government would probably push private sector union density below 20%. But a Labour government, coupled with thoughtful, cooperative behaviour – which is not at all the same as being merely acquiescent – might double that figure. Dissolution or recovery both remain distinct possibilities.●

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2 Henry Phelps Brown, 'The Counter-Revolution Of Our Time', *Industrial Relations* 29(1), Winter 1990.
3 Alan Carruth and Richard Disney, 'Where Have Two Million Trade Union Members Gone?', *Economica* 55, 1988.
4 Alison Booth, *What Do Unions Do Now?*, Economics Department Working Paper, Brunel University, March 1989.
5 Richard Freeman and Jeffrey Pelletier, 'The Impact Of Industrial Relations On British Union Density', *British Journal Of Industrial Relations*, 28(2), July 1990.

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Sticky Memories

More tv game-show satire is scheduled for the autumn. **Sara Villiers** spends some sticky moments with **Julian Clary** the high-priest of trash culture

It's tourist season in Edinburgh and everyone is cashing in on the summer crowds, from the woman shaking a Greenpeace tin outside Waterstones to the tv personality flogging books within. A large blackboard proclaims: 'Julian Clary, star of *Sticky Moments* is signing copies of his book *My Life With Fanny The Wonder Dog*'. Passers-by stop, intrigued, but don't enter. Everyone seems hesitant about confronting him in the flesh.

Inside, Julian Clary's flesh is a becoming beige, complemented by dusky blusher. He's signing books with a flourish using a big pink highlighter pen. Copies pile up on the desk in front of him as he peers anxiously at the crowds milling outside the windows. 'Edinburgh people are *so* reserved,' he sighs. Addison Cresswell, his manager, paces up and down, disheartened. A genuine hustler, he has a likeable Del-boy demeanour, boyish good looks and a fast line in patter.

A trio of middle-aged fans drift in to buy a copy. 'Hello,' says Clary pleasantly, 'nice to meet you.' They nod shyly and rush out, one of them clutches her copy of his book to her chest as though to shield her from Julian's critical attention. He is, after all, renowned for mercilessly picking on contestants deemed to have unenlightened dress sense.

Clary's own fashion tastes are, to say the least, unusual. Today, he's resplendent in a dalmation-spotted cowboy suit with fringes and rhinestone trimming. A day-glo t-shirt, shiny black leather boots and studded dog-collar complete the look. The effect cries out for an audience but the place is virtually empty. Cresswell shunts us into the shop staff room where Clary eases his long frame into a small sofa.

The Mincing Machine is visibly wilting, but he manages to flash a smile with lips coated in a brilliant red that makes my Miss Selfridge's 'Scarlett O'Hara' seem muted. He dons the full gear and heavy make-up each time he makes a public appearance but admits that in private he is more sober. 'After my stage outfits all other clothes are a bit of an anti-climax, I wear anything – as long as it's clean.'

The book he is here to promote, a hilarious photo-montage, is a hyperbolic and absurdist account of his early career. It has but a fleeting relationship with the truth. Like many comedians, the gregarious public image is at odds with the private person. He is reticent about his background, disclosing only that he was brought up in Teddington – 'typical suburbia'. Educated at a Catholic public school run by Benedictine monks he, not surprisingly, found college a liberating experience.

'I'm very quiet,' Clary reflects. 'I don't like parties, I don't like theatres, I don't like cinemas. I do know how to have a good time though. I have a close social circle and we make our own fun. In general I go home, walk the dog and do the housework.' Cresswell endorses this: 'Gawd yes, he's a real homeboy.'

His first stage persona was Gillian Pie Face: 'It consisted of a blonde wig and a cheap kaftan and involved being a sort of agony aunt.' He pauses and shakes his head, 'I was awful'. He later reinvented himself as the Joan Collins Fan Club.

In contrast to the pantomime-dame aspect of Gillian Pie Face, this new act was slicker, more glamorous – involving lots of tight black rubber suits. To pad out his previous 20-minute slot to a one-hour solo show he included songs and brought in a young pianist, Russell Churney, always introduced by Clary as 'the only heterosexual working in showbusiness today'. *Dynasty* was riding high in the television charts and the show captured everyone's imagination. Clary's career took off.

When a frosty Ms Collins threatened to sue, he became known as the Mincing Machine. The steady rounds of national tours over the past few years have won him bedrock support, particularly in Glasgow, Manchester, Newcastle and Hull, but it is television which has ensured him household-name status and secured the honour of national icon as a *Spitting Image* puppet.

He has won fame at a time when many from Britain's new wave of alternative humour are hitting the small screen but unlike his contemporaries he eschews political satire and sketches. 'I wanted to keep the best part of my stage act, which was the exhanges with the audience. The game-show format is ideal. The questions and answers are all written down but everything else is spontaneous.'

Although his upfront self-evident homosexuality could only have been so easily assimilated into mainstream television in the last decade, Clary's act is curiously old-fashioned. His image stems from the glam rock and cross-dressing of 70s' gender benders Bolan and Bowie. His humour owes much to the nudge-wink traditions of the *Carry On* team and the vulgar comedy of Frankie Howerd. But Clary has taken the art of innuendo to a sophisticated level. His mix of quasi-bondage, surreal chiffon and the provocatively arched eyebrow are infinitely more appealing than Howerd's scruffy suits and puckered lips.

Sticky Moments has been a landmark in television history. It follows the tame, game-show conventions but charts them round playful sexual topics with quiz questions like: 'People shouldn't wear nylon underwear because... ?' Correct answer: 'It gives them thrush.' Clary emulates his game-show hero Bruce Forsyth, with a clever concoction of ritual humiliation and encouragement for the contestants, mocking their haircuts but giving them extra points for being 'spunky'. Hugh Jelly, a small squat man, prances around in a tutu – a refreshing antidote to Anthea and all her instantly forgettable imitators.

The Generation Game provided a framework for *Sticky Moments* with its silly, preferably messy, tasks, embarrassing ad-libbed plays and off-tune songs, but the differences are palpable. The painfully tacky costumes and decor are a witty, self-parodic temple to trash culture – and Julian is the high priest. His camp repartee and glorious outfits could not contrast more with the conventional, besuited image of the game-show host. And above all, unique among his peers, he is gorgeous.

Clary is the first New Age game-show host, breathing life into a failing form and chugging the format into the next decade. They're currently filming another 10 shows, a welcome respite for Clary from his recent arduous touring schedule. 'I love touring most, he insists, 'but after weeks of being on the road, its really nice to walk into a tv studio where you just murmur something about a cup of tea and suddenly it appears and you have someone to do your make-up, fold your clothes and lead you down to the studio. It's wonderful to be so

Peter Mountain

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

pampered. But then again, after a few weeks of that you think – oh, leave me alone.'

'Can we take a short commercial break now,' grins Cresswell popping his head round the door. A queue of people craving Clary's attention has formed. He disappears to dispense signed copies and wit. I down my coffee and peer into his make-up bag to learn that he uses Leichner make-up, the thick theatrical stuff.

They return with a gaggle of people in tow, Cresswell is in much better humour. 'Think you could bung us a copy of this Greavsie book,' he yells at a Waterstones staff member, brandishing a hardback bearing a garish mug shot of Jimmy Greaves. 'There's a chapter on Julian in it.''Oh, honestly, it's just a sentence, not a chapter,' mutters Clary, sucking on a Marlboro.

Clary's plans for the future include a possible sit-com called *The Man From Uranus*, a sort of *Mork And Mindy* situation, pitching Clary as an alien forced to live among ordinary people. It's the informing principle for all his shows, contrasting the exotic flower that is Julian Clary with some common-or-garden shrubbery, 'usually supply-teacher types'.

Cresswell indicates it's time to go. 'I'm worried about his face, you see,' he quips. 'He's put it on twice today already, it'll get all spotty!' Clary gathers up his belongings, says a polite goodbye and minces away, while Cresswell fields further questions. 'Yeah, we get a lot of attention from the tabloids,' he says 'The *Sun* and *The Star* are always phoning the office but since he's out of the closet they can hardly nobble him for anything can they?'

It's suddenly obvious that Julian Clary's protective mask is not his Leichner make up at all but his hyper-efficient, hard-nosed manager who deftly fields all inquisitive enquiries. 'We're off,' grins Cresswell. 'It's all a load of rock 'n' roll innit... ?' And he's gone, with just the essence of that Cheshire Cat smirk floating in the room behind him.●

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

For the state of the arts.

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Paolo Hewitt reports on radio pirates with a licence to spin

Kiss And Tell

On September 1, Kiss FM will start broadcasting legally to an expectant London. Expectant because Kiss FM, as opposed to the newly launched Jazz FM, already has a huge audience behind it, thanks to its popularity as a pirate radio station between 1985 and 1988. With its adventurous dance-music policy and high profile, Kiss FM managed to beat Radio One into second place in an *Evening Standard* poll of Londoners' favourite radio stations.

'Kiss had a huge influence,' explains Norman Jay, one of the station's DJs, who joined two days after it first started transmitting, 'up until then most illegal radio was aimed at the suburban audience. Nobody catered for the emergent inner-London club culture, which some of our DJs were part of. We were able to cross it over to a wider audience.'

'Although Kiss, with its new daytime audience, will move away from its old image as a radical radio station, it cannot afford to alienate its listeners from the past'

'The difference between Kiss FM DJs and DJs on Capital or Radio One is that for most of those guys it's just a job. In many ways they are inaccessable people, whereas I might do a show on a Saturday and be with the listeners in a record shop a few hours later. We've got the advantage of that rapport.'

Kiss FM was started by Gordon Mac, and its early roster of DJs reads like a training squad for today's record-makers. Jazzie B, Coldcut and Richie Rich all presented shows, while other DJs, such as Norman Jay, who now runs his own record label, and Jay Strongman are mainstays of the current club scene.

Kiss started at a time when London was being swamped by pirate stations, most of which catered solely for dance-music enthusiasts. The demand had been created by the growing interest in club culture and music – and by national radio's refusal to reflect this shift in taste. Although a lot of Londoners had been brought up on a diet of Tony Blackburn's morning shows, by the time they reached their teens Radio One was perceived to be slanted more towards their mums. The early 80s saw a boom in pirate radio which tried to redress this balance.

There can be no doubt that the success of dance records such as Raze's *Jack Your Body* or Doug E Fresh's *The Show*, which hurtled into the charts in the mid-80s, was due, in no small part, to pirate radio's support and commitment. The old idea that to have a hit you must get Radio One airplay was seriously undermined.

The record companies were among the first to realise this new route to chart success. Although they decried pirate radio in public because of its illegality, major record companies were not beyond hustling pirates to have their records added to the playlist. This led to rival pirate stations, eager to compete for much-needed cash, revealing the whereabouts of their opponents to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), who are responsible for granting licences. Kiss FM maintained a professionalism which kept it above these squabbles.

In 1988, in response to the proliferation of pirates, the DTI announced that a limited number of licences were being made available. The only condition of application was that pirate stations had to come off the air before they could be considered. Kiss FM closed down and mounted an impressive campaign to win a licence. The DTI turned Kiss down and awarded a licence to Jazz FM.

Undeterred, Gordon Mac refused to buckle under pressure to return to piracy and kept the Kiss name alive by promoting various club events. Six months later he was given the go-ahead. 'We were always confident that sooner or later they would have to give in to us,' says Jay. 'We knew that the foundation for Kiss FM was stronger than the authorities really knew.'



Legal spin-off: Old pirate turns the table

Kiss FM will now broadcast 24 hours, seven days a week. They have people like Virgin among their backers, but will have to seek out a healthy response from advertisers to keep afloat. Kiss, as expected, will keep to its dance-music policy, although this will include other musical strains, such as world music. Their target audience is 10-34 year-olds. They are aiming for 1m listeners and, according to their head of marketing, reject the notion that advertisers will influence their music policy decisions. 'Advertisers are interested in two things,' he says, 'the quality and then the quantity of listeners. That makes it a bit easier for us because we already have a strong identity, people know us. We have to re-activate the Kiss name in young people's minds.'

Although Kiss, with its new daytime audience, will inevitably move away from its old image as a radical radio station, it cannot afford to alienate its listeners from the past: 'We will always play more music than the others,' says Cox, 'but we will have to introduce elements that we didn't carry as a pirate station. People expect something other than music from a breakfast show.' Norman Jay also believes that Kiss must resist any outside influences. 'We were successful because we did it our way. The moment anybody tries to change that, is the moment that things will start to go wrong.'

From September, listeners will be able to judge for themselves.●

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Olivia Sagan is coming to terms with a foreign culture

Crete's Enigma

I first came to Crete six years ago. This stretch of rock was little more to me than a tourist island – a floating hotel annually rocked by an influx of Europeans from cultures and lifestyles seemingly more real and important than those we were visiting.

My perspective was one of 'us and them', a perspective which sees poverty and calls it quaintness, and sees quaintness and calls it backwardness. The kind of perspective which limits experience with its complex network of bias, ignorance and prejudice.

A little while later, when I came to settle on the island, I was forced to begin the process of unravelling that network and attempt to recognise, among the values I had acquired growing up in a major European capital, those which were false and those which were invalid or unsuitable.

There came a series of lessons which led to an increased understanding of my new environment, its people and its traditions. An increased understanding led to a heightened interest and the two working together formed the basis of a true affection for my adopted home.

Understanding, interest, affection. With this triangle I began to grasp the essence of what it would take to live my life 'abroad'. A life which wouldn't be dulled by being cushioned and isolated by the enigma of foreignness, but which would be capable of charting a personal development on the terms of the new country; a dual journey of discovery.

I would probably always be 'foreign' enough to savour my confrontation with newness, yet I would be sufficiently at home to function and grow unhampered by a constant evaluating and comparing of everything I came across with everything I grew up with. The juxtaposing of two lives, two cultures, two countries and two histories had to stop before I could begin to root myself.

One of my first lessons was to allow the place to define itself. I had assumed, because of its European location, that Crete would possess other European characteristics. I was wrong. Europe, still a relatively new idea to Europe itself, is to Crete an idea of the future. Being so near and yet so far from that idea is still unsettling.

The Cretan readiness to fight for what is theirs is a trait most tourists find intolerable when it is made manifest in heated arguments at the marketplace. Coming from England, I found it not only intolerable but embarrassing. It would take me a while to get used to such flamboyant displays of fervour and temper.

While I was getting used to them, I flicked back some pages of history and gradually this quickness of temper and readiness to defend oneself became more understandable. Pieces of history were slowly falling into place – books, newspapers, letters, and, most lucid of all, personal stories all told of a remarkable tradition of idealistic battle, and of the ferocious determination of a tiny population to keep their land and lives free.

It is only 93 years since Ottoman rule ended in Crete after an oppressive reign of 200 years. The fierce pride of the Cretans becomes less offensive when we discover how consistently the grandparents and parents of these people fought their oppressors. Crete was the last area of Greece to fall into Turkish hands and proved their most troublesome territory. During the years of subservience to various *pashas*, Hellenic and Cretan culture and languages were kept alive by a clandestine information and education network which exploited the forbidding isolation of caves tucked away in the mountains.

During the second world war, with the rest of Greece already occupied, the Nazis had to launch an all-out campaign to take the island. The battle of Crete lasted from May 20 to May 31, 1941. Longer than Hitler had anticipated, and needing more ammunition and troops than had been allocated. Nazi troops were left to freeze outside Moscow and Leningrad partly due to this obstacle to the unfolding of the master plan. Crete, a tiny strip of land a stone's throw away from Libya, was that obstacle.

Loyalty to the past sometimes borders on obsession

The war is still fresh in the minds of both Greeks and Cretans and this loyalty to the past, which at times can seem to border on obsession, is easier to understand if we note that the misery of the second world war was prolonged in Greece by a civil war which continued to ravage the country until 1949. The years of persecution which followed the civil war are still vivid in Greek memory.

Crete is still stinging from this turbulent chapter of history which, even now, doesn't seem to have come to an end. The present battle between the communists and the Right is played out through a consciousness developed in the years during and after the civil war.

The passionate arguments between old-timers in the *kafeneion* about incidents during those years are less noisy and more moving if you stop and listen. Look at the grandfather in knee-length black boots, wetting his huge moustache in a tiny cup of Greek coffee; watch him flick his worry beads and begin to perspire as he remembers. Listen to him tell of still being able to smell the stench of his worm-infested wounds which he cleaned himself daily in order to survive the living hell of one of the punishment islands where communists were left to rot.

Listen also to the old black-clad woman who hid ammunition under her skirts and smuggled it to the guerillas at night, and to the stories of her sister who was one of those guerillas, one of hundreds of women who took up arms. Hear how the sister's small daughter stepped on a land mine left by the Ger-

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mans and exploded into fragments in front of her mother's eyes. How the mother buried the fragments and carried on fighting for what she believed was hers.

The Greek and Cretan obsession with politics is perhaps the easiest characteristic to understand when we remember that Greece is the place where it all began. The word 'politics' itself, democracy, the idea of every person having political responsibility first and foremost to his or her country, the ideals of discussion, debate and government by the people for the people are all embedded in the country's history.

It was in Crete, the home of the great Minoan civilisation, that political and economic systems attained the highest degree of sophistication. The female ancestors of this civilisation where women held great positions of power are the women of Crete and Greece today, whose strength and force probably stem directly from the amazonic and dynamic women of the Minoan race. An ancient envy of this strength by men may well have contributed to the chauvinism which so saturates and hinders contemporary Greece.

But despite their apparently subservient position today, Greek women have always fought side by side with their husbands, fathers and brothers. They have consistently displayed an equally fearless bravery in times of war. There are recorded incidents of women fighting together to save their village in the absence of their menfolk and finally choosing mass suicide instead of surrender. Women today continue to face a system which ignores Plato, one of its best-known philosophers. Some 300 years before Christ, Plato taught that all societies were, and would remain, incomplete as long as the talents and resources of half the human race were missing through the exclusion of women from active society.

This past I have learned of has become the present I am part of, and the two are the histories of a tomorrow which Crete has offered me as my own. Slowly, Crete has become more tangible, a real place, not just a dumping ground for summer spare time, but a place whose history and future are part of a continuum which extends far beyond the summer season.

Traces of information, conversation, experience. Slowly Crete became a place in which I could imagine myself. The present becomes a moment which I can understand in relation to a past which has begun to shed its stories. This past and this present are developing into a future in which my Cretan-born daughter and I will grow.

The stories, the momentum, the discoveries continue. I'm slowly coming to terms with my new home. The aspirations of a country have become my aspirations. Its pulse is felt as regularly as my own. The enigma of foreignness has passed.●

Global Pictures: Queen Victoria's personal stationery was bordered with a complex decorative design by the Scots artist Daniel Maclise. It depicted Britannia, surrounded by the four continents personified as cheerful natives on each corner of the page. This motif was repeated on the lower level of the Albert Memorial in London, and throughout late-Victorian public art.

At the turn of the century, the Singer sewing-machine company advertised its wares in a similar manner, depicting jolly black cotton pickers, native Americans hard at work at the looms and exotic Asian maidens with Mr Singer's great invention proudly revealed at the centre of the known world.

But how is the world known? At such levels of abstraction the image of the globe has long been recruited to embody the interests and beliefs both of imperial powers and multinational corporations. When I was a child in the early 60s, I was still able to thrill at the areas of the map in our long-outdated school atlases which left considerable areas marked as 'Uncharted Territory'. Contemporary technology seems to make such a concept completely redundant.

Whiskered explorers with double-barrelled names may continue to trek off across the ice caps at regular intervals, but perhaps the most fascinating and important *terra incognita* yet to be charted involves the exploration of global imagery, from the spurious unity of Benetton ads to Disneyworld.

The Globe: Representing The World (The Photographers' Gallery, London, September 7 – October 13) is an exhibition which begins this exploration. Paul Wombell has consolidated his position as the most consistently imaginative photographic curator in contemporary Britain. Ranging from images of space mission-control centres in the USA and USSR, to anthropological photography and the military use of aerial photographs, Wombell's project demonstrates just how multiple are the purposes to which the image of 'the world' may be recruited.

The vision of a unified world is indispensable to the cause of thinking about global utopias or global catastrophe. Seen from the distance of space, our planet is revealed as an object of ravishing beauty, enhanced by the shocking sense of its isolation and vulnerability that such images afford.

I recently saw a picture which even showed the Amazon rainforests on fire, their smoke obliterating half a continent. How such images are used to help us think more realistically about the future will be of the utmost importance in the coming years, which seem likely to be dominated by

new conflicts between old nationalisms and the need for global planning.

We are moving towards a millennium in which the nations of the earth seem likely to develop new international federations that we cannot begin to imagine, though we can be confident that they will be the indispensable precondition for the possible emergence of a democratic, pluralist, egalitarian future.

That future depends in large part on our capacity to frame the meaning of 'the globe' in ways which might enhance the chances for the earth's survival as a habitable planet. A thought which goes to the heart of this sobering and inspiring exhibition.●

Simon Watney

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Teresa Gorman's love affair with the market

Read, Right And Blue

Teresa Gorman MP talks to Chris Granlund about the way reading has influenced her life.

My father was a demolition man and we lived in a little house in Putney. We didn't have many books in the house, to my mother they were just dust-collectors. My earliest memory of reading is of getting books from the public library and reading them at home under the blankets with a torch. The middle classes teach their children to read *Alice In Wonderland* and *Winnie The Pooh* but I haven't read many of these childhood classics to this day. Many of the standard references that come into people's conversations were not part of my childhood experience.

But I did read avidly. I loved to read fairy stories, well-illustrated with beautiful line drawings. I also liked detective stories. At one stage I was addicted to dictionaries. I read pages of them, trying to memorise obscure words to dazzle the English teacher.

My father's demolition work meant that he would often be pulling down rather grand buildings from which some things would be salvaged. Once he brought home a set of large heavy books. They turned out to be the collected works of Havelock Ellis. My two brothers and I thought they were terrific and when my father wasn't about we would drag them out. In a way this was my introduction to the more bizarre aspects of human behaviour. I've been an interested observer of human and animal behaviour ever since.

Being a brightish child, I won a scholarship to go to grammar school. The day my mother heard about the scholarship, she said: 'Well don't get any big ideas, because I don't know who is going to pay for the uniform.' I struggled through school and then went on to training college, where I developed more middle-class airs and graces. Once when we were quarrelling about something, my mother said to me: 'You died for me the day you went to that college.' I was being insufferable. Laying the table I would put out a spoon and fork for the pudding. My mother would say: 'And what's all this cutlery for?' And I would answer: 'Well people do eat their pudding with a fork.' She was right to chastise me for that.

It was after college that I got interested in anthropology and read all the Margaret Mead books. One of the things that still fascinates me is anything to do with body language, like Desmond Morris's books, *The Naked Ape* and *Man Watching*. I find them intensely entertaining and amusing. Looking at humans as animals is quite an entertaining way of looking at parliament.

My political views arose out of my experience in the United States in the 60s. I went with my husband and had a teaching job in a very posh Catholic school on Fifth Avenue. I was in frequent conversation with Americans who were rather starry-eyed about the wonders of our socialist system. I got talking to these people about what life under socialism in Britain was really like, and people kept saying to me: 'You've been reading Ayn Rand.' Now I'd never even heard of Ayn Rand at this stage, but I read the novels, the two classics, *Atlas Shrugged* and *The Fountainhead*, which took socialism to pieces and confirmed all my gut reactions against the state.

From Rand I moved on to other American writers on the free market and individualism. The Friedmans, Murray Rothbard, Von Mises, Hayek. From there I got into the whole business of the free-market philosophy of life, which actually ties in with cybernetics – the way in which feed-back mechanisms develop in the animal world as a natural system of control and communication. The free market serves the same purpose in the economy.

America awakened my latent entrepreneurial tendency. When I returned to the UK, I couldn't bear the thought of going back to teaching so I set up in business. *The Daily Telegraph* reviews of the Institute of Economic Affairs pamphlets led me to the British wing of the free-market movement. I became a devotee of *The Spectator* along with *Time* magazine and *Scientific American*.

I enrolled at University College, London to read for a post-graduate degree in the history and philosophy of science. Karl Popper was teaching at the LSE at that time and his *The Open Society And Its Enemies* and *The Poverty Of Historicism* added to my scepticism about people who think they have all the answers on how other people's lives should be organised. By this time I think I truly hated the state.

Setting up my own business led me through lobbying against regulation into the political arena and eventually into parliament via Westminster City Council. My views are often considered to be controversial, like defending ticket touts, but they are based on a consistent intellectual position. It doesn't worry me when people say, 'You must be crazy, it's not good for your political image,' or 'Teresa's only doing it for publicity.' Because Teresa's not. I'm doing it because I believe the state should mind its own business about human behaviour unless people's safety or property rights are infringed.

There's a marvellous book called *Defending The Undefendable* which takes common scapegoats like ticket touts and speculators, people who are considered beyond the pale and points out the role they play and the reason why they exist. Usually it is because of a distortion in the market caused by restrictive practices backed by legislation. For example, slum landlords exist because of government constraints on rent and planning which have created a shortage of affordable housing to rent.

Most of what we do in parliament is a waste of time in terms of altering human behaviour. You might change it through persuasion but not through legislation. In my short time in politics, I don't expect to make much impression on the authoritarians. But if I manage to defend some of the limited rights we already have, like a woman's right to control her own fertility, and perhaps extend a few more by rolling back a bit of the state, I shall have made my contribution.●

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

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BOOKS

Ken Worpole finds young people do it for themselves

Total Culture

The struggle for self-respecting collective identities has, in postwar Britain, moved from work to leisure. Cloth caps, dungarees and steel-capped boots are now more likely to be found on the dance floor than on the early-morning bus. Automation, the rise of the service industries, the decline of UK manufacturing and agriculture (or its displacement elsewhere) have eroded identities based on the workplace, the craft or the skill. Five-year apprenticeships have been replaced by four weeks of YTS or various other ad-hoc training schemes. Even the marketing analysts have moved from occupational categories (academic, white-collar, blue-collar) to lifestyle analyses based partly on self-definition: 'new moralist', 'life's a party', 'young married suburbia' and a multitude of other fine gradations.

What are the public cultural policy implications of these far-reaching changes? If we can't take Lear to the factories any more, or Mozart to the mines, where does democratic cultural policy lead? These are serious issues. For liberal-democratic arts policy has conspicuously failed.

The audience for the theatre, for dance, gallery exhibitions, opera and the classical music repertoire remains resiliently middle-class and higher-educated – and, even more worrying, in the 1980s has actually narrowed for the theatre and the cinema. Widening access to the arts has been rather more difficult than anticipated. But perhaps the original assumptions were profoundly wrong.

Paul Willis and his colleagues on the Gulbenkian enquiry into the cultural activities of young people, **Moving Culture** (*Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, £4.50*), tackle these issues head on. And like punks invading an opera house, they have left behind some serious intellectual damage to conventional assumptions about contemporary cultural policy. **Common Culture** (*Paul Willis, Open University Press, hbk £28.50, pbk £7.99*) the more theoretical of the two reports, is a path-breaking attempt to move arguments about arts policy on to new ground, and difficult though the arguments are to assimilate, I believe it will exert a long-reaching influence over the next decade.

The key premise of the book is that although 95% of young people's lives are untouched by the forms and processes of public arts policy, all young people are to varying degrees highly active in creating their own symbolic cultural worlds – out of the images, sounds, products, dreams and nightmares of commercial popular culture. The cloth of meaning may have to be woven out of a myriad scraps and off-cuts, but woven it is, day after day, year after year. And although there may be little skill required at work for many – Willis quotes a chilling survey which found that 87% of a sample of male manual workers in Peterborough exercised more skill in driving to work than in the work itself – enormous skills are developed and used, often collectively, in sound-mixing, hair-styling, tv watching, clothes design and many other processes of re-reading and re-creating popular culture. Trusting nobody in authority, young people do it for themselves.

It's a convincing case remorselessly argued: Willis is letting nobody off the hook for past failures to respond seriously to young people's evident creativity. But there are several reservations that have to be made. The first is a major absence in the catalogue of certain cultural forms, namely the popular press. When Raymond Williams began his long, pioneering study of the forms of popular culture, he started with the press as being the most paradigmatic. No doubt television has replaced it.

But however creative and re-productive young people are with many cultural forms, the case of the brutalism of the popular press surely needs particular consideration. For there is something about a corner newsagent on a Sunday morning – the xenophobia, the misogyny, the salaciousness, the virulent homophobia, the pornographic images and the endless political lies and distortions – that is *sui generis*. And it is not addressed here.

This leads to a second worry. For in endorsing the rapidity and ingenuity the marketplace has in developing popular cultural forms, there is a danger of intellectual self-liquidation. For if the 'market' is a self-evolving, self-regulating, continuously developing process of production and exchange, then where does the independent cultural producer (or artist) fit in? Archimedes knew it was possible to lift the earth with a lever – but he had to have somewhere else to stand to do it.

There have to be critical, aesthetic and political discourses independent of the marketplace that enable new ideas to develop. For it is precisely because the market is a perpetual motion machine, a sealed system, that it cannot itself create anything new.

The Smiths, Kathryn Tickell, Nigel Kennedy, Stephen Frears, Victoria Wood, Jeanette Winterson, Tony Cragg, Courtney Pine, may be best produced, published and distributed through the marketplace, but it is likely that they began their careers in the subsidised educational system, or in a self-defined avant-garde, or within a commercially marginalised sub-culture. Those seedbeds and self-sustaining networks still need public financial support.

But these are criticisms of detail rather than of overall principle. For the case that Willis argues is vigorous and compelling. The pace of

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technological developments within the cultural sector is phenomenal and not likely to slow down. It is young people, Willis argues, who have shown the greatest sophistication in adapting to the new possibilities for a common culture.

While liberal arts administrators and commentators have defined the success and failure of cultural policy in terms of minor shifts in audience profiles for the traditional forms – a few 'C2s' spotted in the crush bar at the Royal Opera House, extra record sales in Woolworth's for Pavarotti – in the cities of the plains the mushrooming satellite dishes, video rental shops, record fairs, pirate radio stations, high-street style wars and Acid House parties tell a different story. This is, as *Common Culture* graphically reminds us, the modern world. There is a lot of critical catching up to do; there is no reason why public cultural policy should always be a 100 years technologically out of date.●

Suzanne Moore on a voice that won't die away

Nerve Endings

Why do people hate Kathy Acker so much? To judge by some of the vitriolic reviews she has been getting recently for her latest novel **In Memoriam To Identity** (*Pandora £12.95*), it is simply because the woman has got a cheek.

How dare she come over here with her fancy literary theory and pernicious post-modernism and pretend to be a great avant-garde artist? How dare she try so hard? Here in Britain we like writers to write what we already know in a way that we can know it even more. That's good writing. If writers must start mucking about with the muddle of language itself then we'd prefer them to be men.

The fact that women may have more actual reason to break down the prison walls of 'good literature', 'the bourgeois novel' or 'patriarchal language' doesn't seem to come into it. Leave it to the boys. Male critics like Anita Brookner. They can even appreciate Maya Angelou or any feminist who simply replicates structures they already understand.

OK, so I'm being crude; but the criticisms that are thrown at Acker are cruder. Her cutting up and reworking of other texts has all been done before, they say, and better. Which of course is the point. She will keep writing about sex. So does Martin Amis. But worst of all she wears her heart and her theory on her sleeve.

In Acker's work the theory lies uncomfortably naked on the surface of the text. And that's kind of embarrassing because we are used to excavating an author's hidden meaning. Even the title of her latest work gives it away – *In Memoriam To Identity*.

This being Acker, we know that secure, centred identity, that fiction that we live by, will be shattered, that her characters won't be 'proper' characters but fragmented beings whose only real sense of self comes from what they are not, from pain and from sex. Rimbaud, Airplane and Capitol are figures of loss. But most of all they are survivors. They survive the rapes, the sex shows, their childhood rejection. Only their bodies tell the truth.

It's not easy to read. As always with Acker's work, she shows that she can write wonderfully. And that she can write appallingly. From profundity to profanity, from the beautiful to the banal, the hysterical pull of the prose to speak only of itself is wearing. This heretical desire not to represent, not to centralise meaning, is what makes Acker so valuable and so irritating. As the literary establishment are so keen to point out, she is not Burroughs or Beckett. The implication being that only writers of this calibre are allowed to experiment in this way.

But you have only to read her short story Humility in the collection **The Seven Cardinal Virtues** (edited by Alison Fell, *Serpent's Tail £7.99*) to realise her worth. Here in the context of stories by six other women writers, her work stands out not just as courageous experimentation but as absolutely essential. It's not that there is anything wrong with the other stories by established writers like Michèle Roberts and Zöe Fairbairns. They are the very thing that the middle-brow literary establishment raves about: 'the well-crafted short story'. Enjoyable and forgettable.

Acker's piece, one of the best things she has ever written, is a deceptively simple tale about a writer who is accused of plagiarism. It is a deconstructionist's manifesto that is as funny as it is provocative. The writer advised to 'find her own voice' rebels. She doesn't want to be the author as god, she doesn't want to force language to be uni-directional, to present a single viewpoint. Instead she wants to 'be left alone to play', which is why she uses a text by Harold Robbins in her work.

Of course it's tempting to read this as the *real* Kathy Acker's voice, her *real* experience, because for all the tricks, all the technique, we are still desperate to find the origin of the text. Barthes's famous 'death of the author' still only works inside the pages of a book. Outside, the cult of the author is ever stronger.

Indeed, Acker is both victim and benefactor of this. Her intense romanticism about both art and artists only adds to it. The irony is, of course, that she has found some kind of voice whether she wants to own it or not. And she will insist on using it in that very shrine devoted to men who are in love with the sound of their own voices – the literary avant-garde. Never mind the novels, feel the nerve.●

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Marxism Today has moved. From August 24 our new address will be:

6-9 Cynthia Street, London N1 9JF. Tel: 071-278 4430.

Box numbers are free. Entries and replies are strictly confidential. When answering a box number, write your letter to the advertiser, then seal it in an envelope and mark the box number in pencil in the top left-hand corner. Put a stamp on this envelope then place it in another envelope, put a stamp on that and send it to: **Marketplace, Marxism Today, 6-9 Cynthia Street London N1 9JF.**



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MT EVENTS

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● **Manchester: A Marxism Today event** on 'The Future of Europe' is being planned in Manchester. If you have ideas on this theme, or would like to become involved with organising this exciting venture please contact Pat Devine, 2 Hamilton Rd, Whitefield, Manchester. Tel: 061-766 4977.

● **Haringey: 'Farewell to Arms'** Discussion on the peace dividend and the future of British defence policy. Speakers include Peter Tatchell, author of 'Democratic Defence'. Tuesday September 25, 7.45pm at Hornsey Library, Haringey Park, Crouch End, London N8. Organised by Haringey Marxism Today Group. Details: 081 348 8915.

● **Leeds: 'Beyond Thatcherism',** a Marxism Today day event, Saturday November 3. For further details or offers of help contact Bill, on 0532 6263343.

● **Cardiff: 'Charter 88 and Wales'** Discussion on the development of a Welsh citizenship with Rob Humphreys from Charter 88 Welsh Cttee and speaker from Charter 88 Council. Monday September 10, 7.45pm at the Wyndham Street Centre, Cardiff. Details, Peter Davies, 0222 227255.

● **National: A Friday Evening Marxism** *Today Debate on 'Europe after the* Berlin Wall' with Jan Urban of Civic Forum and others will open the 'Futures' event, in London, October 26/27. If you would like to be involved contact Geoff Andrews on 071-251 4406/0865-722512.

THERAPY

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Contributors

Paul Rogers is a defence analyst at Bradford University.
Beatrix Campbell is a reporter and broadcaster.
Richard Evans is professor of history at Birkbeck College and author of *In Hitler's Shadow: West German Historians And The Attempt To Escape From The Nazi Past* (1989).
Martin Pawley's new book *Theory And Design In The Second Machine Age* is published by Basil Blackwell this month.
Martin Woollacott is an assistant editor and former foreign editor of *The Guardian*.
Geoff Mulgan works for Gordon Brown MP.
Stuart Hall is professor of sociology at the Open University and a member of *Marxism Today*'s editorial board.
Fredric Jameson is the author of *Late Marxism: Adorno, Or, The Persistence Of The Dialectic* (Verso).
David Metcalf is professor of industrial relations at the London School of Economics.
Sara Villiers is a freelance writer.
Paolo Hewitt is a freelance writer.
Olivia Sagan lives and writes in Crete.
Simon Watney is a writer and critic and assistant editor of the *National Aids Manual*.
Ken Worpole is currently working on a national study of town cultures.
Suzanne Moore is a freelance writer and film critic for the *New Statesman And Society*.

Additional contributions:
Production: Jenny Boyle, Mick Cooper, Naomi Davis, Tony Rice.
Promotions: Tracy Bass, Heime Frankel, Victoria Harwood, Stuart Moran, Bella Mansfield, Francine Ruckledge, Frank Stone, Ian Tucker.

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Baroness Flather

UPA

Shreela Flather was born in India and studied law at University College, London. She has worked in education as an infant-school teacher for Ilea and later as a teacher of English as a foreign language. She has contributed to innumerable and varied committees ranging from the Commission for Racial Equality to the Conservative Women's National Committee. Since 1976, she has been Tory councillor for Windsor and Maidenhead and in 1986 became the first Asian woman to hold office as mayor. In June 1990 she took her seat in the House of Lords.

What newspapers do you take? *The Independent, Sunday Telegraph, Maidenhead Advertiser* and *The Windsor Express.*

What foreign languages do you speak? English.

What are your favourite tv programmes? *Bonanza* and early *Dr Who.*

When do you listen to music? Rarely.

When was the last time you prayed? Some time ago.

What was your first thought this morning? Another beautiful day.

Do you have a recurring dream? I used to dream of India, now I have no recurring dream.

What is the most common colour in your wardrobe? My wardrobe is full of different colours, I am happy to say.

What is your favourite meeting place? My home, because it reflects my personality.

Which piece of architecture moves you to either heaven or hell? My favourite is the Natural History Museum, for its colour balance and detail; my worst is the Department of the Environment in Marsham Street.

Who do you reveal your secrets to? Most of them I reveal to my husband, some to my friends.

What makes you feel secure? Family and friends.

How regularly do you consult your horoscope? Once a week in *The Windsor Express.*

What do you blame your parents for? For spoiling me.

What do you envy about your children's lifestyle? Their freedom and opportunities.

What is your biggest regret? Not having become a dancer.

You're driving through a hot, desolate expanse. What's playing on the stereo? I don't have a stereo, but it would probably be Radio Four if I could get it.

Which is your city of the 90s? Berlin: I believe that a united Germany will be the most important country in the world in the 90s.

Where do you wish you were living? London – I love its variety.

Where is your favourite holiday destination? Spain. I feel culturally at home there and I like its historic cities and the coast.

How has your diet changed in the past 10 years? Less meat, less dairy produce, more vegetables.

What physical exercise do you do? I cycle on my exercise bike when I am feeling virtuous.

Under what circumstances would you use private medicine? To avoid wasting time.

At what age do you want to stop working? When I feel like it.

Do you really need your car? Yes.

Do you own shares? No.

What is your favourite advertisement? British Telecom.

What are you doing for the environment? Not enough.

Who do you respect? Mahatma Gandhi, particularly for tackling the iniquities of the caste system.

What do you no longer believe in? Knights in shining armour.

What would you die for? How can one ever know?

What current campaign do you most support? Equal opportunities.

What do you now own that you had never dreamed of owning? A title.

What is the greatest amount of money you've spent on an item of clothing? Regrettably, £500 on a fur coat.

What hi-tech device scares you? Most of them.

How much time do you spend each day on the phone? About three quarters of an hour.

Under what circumstances would you support censorship? For incitement of racial hatred.

Are you better off paying your poll tax? Yes.

What makes you feel guilty? Being unnecessarily sharp to people.

Complete this sentence: If I were dictator for a day... I would make all men and women swap their jobs.

What more do you want to achieve? To make a contribution in the House of Lords.●

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

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